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SBSI Congress broken up 
On 19 September, the security forces detained nine labour activists, two Australian trade unionists 
and two Dutch journalists. The police had moved in to break up the Congress of the independent 
trade union, the SBSI. The SBSI has not been recognised by the government and has been subjected 
to continuous harassment by the authorities. 
The SBSI, the Indonesian Welfare Trade Union, had 
decided to hold its Second Congress under difficult cir-
cumstances. Its chairperson and founder, Muchtar Pakpa-
han is on trial and has spent more than a year in jail on 
subversion charges. One of the main purposes of the Con-
gress was to elect a new board and develop a new strategy. 
'J:he authorities didn't allow it to happen. 
It takes a lot of courage to become a member of the 
SBSI. The mere fact that a worker had joined the union can 
result in dismissal. Many SBSI members have served 
prison sentences because of their role in labour conflicts. 
SBSI is well known internationally; it has affiliated to the 
World Confederation of Labour and has established close 
contacts with trade unions all over the world. 
The Congress was attended by SBSI representatives 
from 87 different places in Indonesia. It was also attended 
by a dozen international representatives from trade union 
federations in Australia, Canada, Holland, Malaysia and 
the Philippines. Present also were representatives from two 
international federations, the ICFTU and the WCL, as well 
as delegates from the ILO, the Asian-American Free La-
bour Institute, the International Metalworkers Federation 
and representatives from a dozen foreign embassies. 
Enemy of the state 
From the outset the organisers were dogged by difficul-
ties. The authorities turned down a request for the Congress 
to be held at a Jakarta hotel as a result of which the board 
decided to hold the Congress on their own premises. This 
does not require a permit but the authorities were deter-
mined to stop the Congress anyway. 
The participants had just heard a message from Pakpa-
han in which he urged the union to 'continue to fight and 
not to surrender until the destiny of the workers had im-
proved (and) remember that only workers themselves, 
through real unions, can improve their destiny'. Statements 
of solidarity had also been read out. During the intermis-
sion, police from the South Jakarta district backed up by 
forces from the Metropolitan Police moved in. Thirteen 
people were taken in, including four foreign guests. 
Sunarty, SBSl's secretary-general and Lutfie Hakim, an 
SBSI lawyer were among those arrested. 
The two detained foreign trade unionists were Greg 
Sword, senior vice-president of the Australian Congress of 
Trade Unions, a senior official in the Australian Labour 
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Party and Ma Wei Pin, the regional secretary of the Inter-
national Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, 
Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers Association. Two 
Dutch journalists were released in the evening after having 
their identities checked. 
SBSI has always been seen as a major threat by the 
authorities. The emergence of SBSI in 1992 was very 
timely. It coincided with a wave of labour conflicts. In Feb-
ruary 1994 Muchtar Pakpahan declared a nation-wide one-
hour stoppage in which an estimated 750,000 workers took 
part. The main demands were freedom of association and 
the adoption of a minimum wage of Rp 7,000. A month 
later, a workers' protest in Medan turned into a long hot 
week of action and rioting in this main city of North Su-
matra. SBSI and in particular Muchtar Pakpahan were ac-
cused of having 'incited' the workers .. 
During the short period of its existence , the SBSI has 
managed to shatter two ideologic(!.1 bastions of the New 
Order. One is the corporatist model of allowing only a sin-
gle organisation in any sector of the community. The SBSI 
as an independent trade union has shown that such a body 
conforms with the needs of the workers, exposing the offi-
cial union, the FSPSI, as being nothing more than an empty 
shell. The protests in Medan along with the riots that fol-
lowed in their wake also shattered the reputation of the Su-
harto regime as being capable of guaranteeing political sta-
bility for foreign and domestic investors. Many factories 
were damaged and the main shopping centres in Medan 
sustained heavy losses because of the looting and arson. * 
New labour law widely rejected 
Despite the many protests from grass roots organisations, the Indonesian parliament unanimously 
adopted a controversial labour bill on 11 September. Outside parliament, workers demonstrated 
against the bill but the government organised a counter demonstration in support of the bill. 
The day after the legislation was enacted, President Su-
harto instructed Labour Minister Abdul Latief to do eve-
rything possible to popularise the new law before it goes 
into effect next year. Abdul Latief then announced that the 
government would issue eight new regulations covering the 
right to strike and to organise as well as a regulation re-
garding lay-offs. The new law replaces fourteen ordinances 
and labour laws, some.dating back to the fifties. 
Workers left with no rights 
The basic ideology of the New Order is to deny the ex-
istence of classes. All groups in society must work harmo-
niously together and Daddy State will take care of every-
thing. For workers, this is translated into a doctrine called 
Hubungan Industrial Pancasila (HIP, Pancasila Industrial 
Relations) which denies workers all their rights. This doc-
trine was devised by the corrupt, authoritarian Admiral 
Sudomo, during his term as labour minister, after complet-
ing a stint as head of the all-powerful security body Kop-
kamtib (dissolved in 1988). 
Workers demonstrating in front of Parliament against the 
new Labour Law 
The new law has been in preparation for four years and 
throughout, it has come under strong criticism. Even within 
the rubber-stamp parliament, some MPs have pressed for 
changes. Although much of the wording has been revised, 
the fundamentals remained: no basic rights for the workers. 
On paper, workers are allowed to set up unions in the 
workplace but the new law will require trade unions to 
register and submit the names of all their members to the 
government. Article 33 stipulates that it will be for the 
government to decide whether the new organisation com-
plies with the legislation. This is in contravention of inter-
national conventions, in particular ILO conventions No. 98 
and 87, which uphold freedom of association and reject any 
intervention by the government. Teten Masduki, labour 
coordinator at the legal aid foundation (YLBHI), argues 
that it will be virtually impossible for independent trade 
unions like the SBSI, the SBM and the PPBI to win recog-
nition. In any case, the law specifically mentions the FSPSI 
as the only recognised workers' organisation in the coun-
try. 
On strikes, workers will be required to notify the gov-
ernment and the company management about plans to go 
on strike. Moreover, all actions must be kept within the 
factory. According to Minister Latief, 'Rallies will be 
banned because· we want workers to resolve problems with 
the management at the workplace and through delibera-
tion'. He warns against the danger of 'third parties' inter-
vening if rallies are allowed. Workers who break the law 
will face criminal charges, with heavy fines or prison sen-
tences. 
It is precisely because workers' rights do not exist that 
NGOs and ·student groups have come forward to assist 
workers in their disputes with the bosses. Independent un-
ions have no direct access to the factories and are therefore 
forced to recruit members outside the factory gates. Rallies 
are ~o~ part of ~he tradition of workers' actions, as a way 
of lmkmg up with workers at other factories, and raising 
similar slogans for better wages and conditions. 
continued on page 6 
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Currency crisis grips the economy 
In just a few weeks in August this year, the value of the rupiah plummeted against the US dollar by 
21 per cent. Some economists predict that the Indonesian currency will continue to fall for the rest of 
the year. The debacle started with the/all in the value of the Thai currency, the baht, in July. Within 
days it became clear that Thailand's economic crisis was contagious and would spread throughout 
the region. Within days all the currencies in the region had plunged sharply. 
The social and political implications are certain to be 
5iubstantial. Years of uninterrupted economic growth in the 
Southeast Asian economies had led ASEAN rulers to be-
lieve in their own invincibility. It has become an article of 
faith for them to proclaim to the world at iarge that 'as long 
as we can fill the bellies of our people, civil and political 
freedoms can take a back seat'. These so-called Asian val-
ues have been shown to be fundamentally flawed as finan-
cial crisis begins to grip the economies of Southeast Asia. 
The prestige and legitimacy of the A SEAN rulers have suf-
fered a severe blow, while the social and political conse-
quences are likely to be felt for years to come. 
Clawless tigers 
The Thai baht fell in value by 25 per cent in early July 
and soon the other currencies followed suit. Thailand tried 
to buck the market by using billions of dollars in an attempt 
to defend the baht, but to no avail. Even an IMF-led rescue 
operation worth US$16 billion has done .little to contain the 
crisis, as other currencies continued to tumble. By the end 
of August, the value of the rupiah had fallen to more than 
Rp3,000 to the US dollar, an unprecedented decline. Fore-
casts that 1998 would be another year of 'robust' growth for 
the ASEAN economies have had to be drastically revised. 
In early September, economists who had predicted growth 
rates of between 7 and I 0 percent for 1998 have now low-
ered their forecasts to between 3 and 4 per cent. 
The ASEAN crisis has been front page news in the in-
ternational financial press for weeks. As a result of the op-
erations of the globalised economy, the crisis in Southeast 
Asia has now shaken Wall Street and stock markets around 
the world. 
The old saying that when Wall Street sneezes the rest of 
the world catches cold is now working in reverse. Some 
analysts estimated that the Southeast Asian crisis could cut 
global economic growth by 0.5 per cent. 
All of a sudden, all the euphoria about the miraculous 
tiger economies in Southeast Asia has been replaced by 
doom-laden talk of speculation, overheating, disregard for 
regulations and wasteful displays of wealth. The funda-
mentals of the tiger economies are no longer being de-
scribed as sound. · 
Capital influx, a blessing and a curse 
The ASEAN economic boom started little more than a 
decade ago, in 1985. The core countries of ASEAN, Thai-
land, Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, 
started to attract large foreign investments, initially from 
Japan and later from the more advanced 'tiger' Asian 
economies, Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong.There 
was a major shift of labour-intensive production to cheap-
labour economies on the southern periphery of Asia. By 
1996, Japan had ploughed an unprecedented US$50 billion 
into the ASEAN economies, resulting in dizzying growth 
rates. The young tigers, the so-called cub economies of 
Southeast Asia, quickly became part of the global econ-
omy, introducing deregulation in tune with global free 
market principles. 
Limping tiger economies Guardian 30 Aug.97 
The ASEAN stock markets quickly became integrated 
into the world equity market. By the early nineties, the 
ASE.AN bourses had become the hottest thing around, at-
tractmg more and more of the global financial flow. Many 
ASEAN corporations went public and their equities were 
much sought after in the global stock market. US invest-
ments in Asian funds increased no less than eighteen-fold 
in five years. The emerging markets of the cub economies 
also becam~ a target for speculative capital. Portfolio capi-
tal poured m, on the lookout for quick-yielding profits. A 
new class of business tycoon emerged, the Gordon Gekko 
types. These high-spending ASEAN yuppies could easily 
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acquire loans from abroad with massive investments being 
made in risky and often unsavoury projects. 
With the collapse of the currency markets in July and 
August, international 'speculators came under attack and 
were bl~med ~or the _c~tastrophe. This was the line taken by 
Malaysian Pnme Minister Mahathir Muhammad who por-
trayed George S~ros as the evil genius behind the turmoil, 
bent on destroying ASEAN for admitting Burma as a 
member. The Indonesian authorities announced that market 
speculation was an act of subversion punishable by death. 
Of course, speculation has played a key role, but what the 
ASEAN rulers have chosen to ignore is that speculation 
can only flourish if the circumstances are ripe. 
Casino economy 
. Durin~ the past ~ec~de, huge sums of money have been 
invested in qmck-y1eldmg projects, notably the real estate 
sector, golf courses and other useless ventures. The real 
estate sector soon became overheated and is now on the 
":erge of collapse. It's the same everywhere: empty high-
nse office buildings in Manila, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur 
and Jakarta, half-empty five-star hotels and half-finished 
projects. Th~iland w~ th_e first to be struck as developers 
dragged theu financiers mto bankruptcy. Non-performing 
loans, the current euphemism for loans that can't be serv-
iced or repaid, have increased exponentially. 
In the past decade, the private sector in Indonesia has 
exceeded the State in foreign debts. A bout 60 per cent of 
Indonesia's foreign debt which now amounts to US$115 
billion, is in the private sector, while about US$33 billion 
are short-term loans. The fall in value of the rupiah can 
only pile on the agony as more and more domestic cur-
rency will be needed to repay these debts, some of which 
are bound to default. 
The World Bank which has for years heaped praise on 
the tiger economies has now published a report lamenting 
the weaknesses of the financial sectors in the ASEAN 
countries and recommending a drastic reform of the bank-
ing sector. The Bank has advised these governments not to 
postpone difficult choices like liquidating bad debtors and 
closing down insolvent financial institutions. It has called 
for the application of global standards in banking supervi-
sion, capital adequacy requirements and risk-taking tech-
niques. Yet until very recently, the World Bank was 
speaking about Indonesia in glowing terms as a success 
story. 
Probably the most important feature of the global casino 
economy is the fact that finance has gained the upper hand 
over industry, while rentiers have gained the tipper hand 
over investors. Trading in equities has often been more 
profitable than creating wealth through industrial ventures. 
Hot capital, otherwise known as portfolio capital, has 
poured in to A SEAN capitals. Young Asian nouveau riche 
patronise fashionable bars in Bangkok, Manila and Jakarta 
flaunting their wealth in brandnew Mercedes or BMWs'. 
iiiiiiiiiin;;:::::;;r====:;::;::;:::=====----~--~- Financial reports show that up to 
60 per cent of Indonesian listed 
companies have debts totally de-
nominated in foreign currencies, 
mostly US dollars. Another fun-
damental flaw is the lack of any 
long-term industrial strategy. In-
vestment in human resources -
education, research and develop-
ment - is the most important di-
mension of any long-term strategy 
but most ASEAN countries have 
ignored this. With the exception 
of Singapore, ASEAN countries 
still rely on the mass production 
of consumer goods through the 
exploitation of cheap labour. Cor-
porations like Nike which thrive 
in the global economy will have 
no trouble finding new havens for 
production in countries with semi-
starvation wages capable of com-
peting with countries in the 
ASEAN region. 
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Ad in Indonesian daily REPUBLIKA warning the public 
about dollar speculation 
ASEAN elites have also be-
come in~?lved in gl~orous, prestige projects of doubtful 
profitab1hty. Malaysia and Indonesia in particular have 
launched mega projects in which the families of the ruling 
elite are the lead players. 
But the problems go much deeper than the collapse of 
the building sector. Unsound banking has mushroomed in 
the past fifteen years. There are no fewer than 240 domes-
tic banks in Indonesia, most of which came into being in 
the roaring eighties when it was as if the sky was the limit. 
Many are expected to collapse, causing havoc for smaller 
companies and businesses.The financial systems of Thai-
land, Indonesia and Malaysia lack transparency and are 
notoriously inefficient The central banks are unable to ex-
ert control over the financial institutions. Rampant corrup-
tion and collusion between the bureaucracy and business 
have only exacerbated the present financial problems 
Mega projects shelved 
While the ~alaysian Pri~e Minister has shown a pref-
erence for projects dressed m superlatives like the tallest 
~owers and. the bigg~st dams, Indonesia's dictator is more 
interested m promotmg the business interests of his six 
sons and daughters. Both are long on prestige but short on 
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benefit for the economy. Their projects are wasteful and a 
burden for tax-payers. Now, as they stand on the brink of 
financial disaster, both countries have been compelled to 
shelve a number of major projects. The postponement, or 
perhaps even the abandonment, of the controversial Bakun 
dam in East Malaysia is one of the positive outcomes of the 
present turmoil. 
As for Suharto, he has been forced to cut down his own 
flesh and blood by postponing favoured First Family proj-
ects. One project likely to be axed is a 95km (sic) bridge, 
the world's longest of course, connecting Indonesia and 
Malaysia, to be constructed by a private consortium of In-
donesian and Malaysian companies. The Indonesian part-
ner, PT Malindo Transmadu, is owned by Siti Hediati 
(Titiek), Suharto's second daughter, wife of Major General 
Prabowo, who commands the notorious Kopassus, the red-
beret corps. The Malaysian government has already indi-
cated that this costly project will not go ahead on schedule. 
Another project under a cloud is a rail-and-road termi-
nal in the leafy sector of central Jakarta. This US$285 
million project is linked to Tutut Suharto, the eldest and 
politically most ambitious daughter. Another of Tutut's pet 
projects to be slashed is a US$176 million bridge linking 
Java and the island of Madura. Another in the Family to 
have his wings clipped is grandson Ary Sigit Suharto 
whose US$950 million bridge linking Java and Sumatra 
has been shelved. Ary Sigit is now famed as one of the 
greediest in the Suharto brood, with a knack of choosing 
business ventures that have a direct impact on consumers. 
A year ago, he was forced by his grandfather to abandon a 
venture which would have earned him millions from taxing 
bottled beer, causing a rumpus throughout the tourist in-
dustry. A month ago he grabbed the headlines with a 
scheme obliging parents to buy his 'national shoe' or sep-
nas, for their children. Like Tommy Suharto's 'national car', 
the shoes are in fact manufactured in Korea but granddad 
had to intervene again after a public outcry against the 
scheme. 
Another mega project to be postponed is the Jakarta 
Tower, a 558-meter high telecommunications tower fi-
nanced by Suharto's cousin Sudwikatmono and slated to 
become one of the tallest structures in the world. Alto-
gether US$ I 3 .3 billion worth of projects have been shelved 
by the government, including fourteen power-generation 
projects. 
Down and out 
Confronted by the ASEAN stock market crisis, portfo-
lio or hot capital is turning to less turbulent regions like 
Latin America and Eastern Europe and it could take a year 
or more for foreign funds to return to the region with any 
confidence. Comparisons are being made with the crisis 
that struck Mexico in December 1994 known as the tequila 
crisis, as well as the Japanese economic recession now en-
tering its fifth year. The financial crisis in ASEAN repli-
cates the tequila crisis in a number of respects. On that oc-
casion, it fell to Washington to cobble together a rescue 
operation, injecting tens of billions of US dollars into 
Mexico's central bank. With both economies being so 
closely intertwined, Mexico's downfall would have had 
severe repercussions for its northern brother. Mexico has 
never been the same since. The Mexican political land-
scape has changed· beyond recognition, the tequila crisis 
having precipitated the collapse of the 60-year rule of PRI 
ECONOMY 
GOLKAR strategists are no doubt pondering the conse-
quences of the current financial turmoil. 
Japan's economic woes started with the collapse of land 
and share prices and now, the gradual recovery has re-
ceived another blow from the turbulence in the countries of 
Southeast Asia, all of which are closely integrated with the 
Japanese banking and manufacturing sectors. Many Japa-
nese banks are in a bad shape, having to write off a large 
number of loans. There was yet more bad news when, prior 
to the G7 meeting in Hong Kong last month, it was an-
nounced that Japan's Gross Domestic Product had fallen 
again. 
Economics can hardly be called an exact science and 
economic theories seem to have little relevance to real life. 
Practising good economics is more a question of confi-
dence-building, like going to the shrink. If a government 
takes measures that are perceived as being satisfactory, all 
the players in the economy can settle down in the knowl-
edge that things are bound to improve.But the very thing 
that is lacking today in Southeast Asia is confidence and 
most commentators see the plight of Indonesia and Thai-
land as being the worst. Both have huge insolvencies in the 
banking sector as well as a major crisis of confidence 
among investors and businessmen. 
Rumblings at the top 
In September a team of cabinet ministers announced a 
package of ten measures, including the revision of the State 
budget, the liquidation of insolvent banks, removal of the 
restriction on foreigners owning only 49 per cent of shares 
in listed Indonesian companies and the rescheduling of 
some State and private projects. Bank Indonesia more than 
doubled the base interest rate from 14 to 30 per cent. This 
extreme tightening of fiscal policy has hit a number of 
businesses very hard, causing many to shift their money 
into bank deposits and out of productive activity. Along 
with the postponement of a number of mega projects, these 
measures appear to have steadied the value of the rupiah, 
suggesting that crisis management has begun to take effect. 
Indonesian ministers have shown more restraint than their 
counterparts in Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur. But the fun-
damentals of the Indonesian economy look far from 
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healthy. Indonesia is the world's third largest debtor, while 
the ratio of Indonesia's total foreign debt to foreign reserves 
in June 1997 was about 500 per cent compared to 220 per 
cent in Thailand. 
While Indonesia watchers have compared Indonesian 
politics to Jurassic Park, the Indonesian economy has been 
portrayed as being full of vigour. Such assessments are 
beginning to come unstuck as many sections of the Indone-
sian elite are likely to be hit as the financial crisis takes its 
toll. Criticism of Suharto and his family could escalate 
after years of enjoying the support of a middle class who 
has the regime to thank for its affluence. Anger at the greed 
of the Suharto dynasty is already widespread and it can be 
predicted that Suharto's political and ideological funda-
mentals will be damaged as the economy contracts. Blam-
ing the communists has lost its shine, while conflicts be-
tween social and religious groups have become more ap-
parent. The time for showing fear and deference towards 
brute military power is passing as criticism of the military 
and the police is becoming more vocal. A weakened econ-
omy can only strengthen anti-regime sentiments as more 
people begin to realise that the dinosaurs stifling the body 
politic have to be removed. Nepotism, corruption and col-
lusion have become fundamentals in Indonesia and the 
stumbling block for urgent reforms. New openings for fun-
damental change in Indonesia are beginning to emerge. 
More social unrest 
According to official figures, 11.5 per cent (around 22.5 
million people) of the population still live below the pov-
erty line, but others conclude that around 100 million peo-
ple, half the popula~i9n, are living in poverty. The present 
economic crisis can only worsen their plight. Free market-
eer theoreticians have argued that wealth created by rapid 
economic growth will 'trickle down' to people at the bot-
tom of the pile, but as one economist has recently re-
marked: 'Of all the crackpot theories dreamt up by the free-
marketeers in the past 20 years, trickle-down economics 
has been the biggest flop'. 
Already in the past year, many parts of Indonesia have 
exploded in riots triggered by often trivial issues. After a 
few months of relative calm, Indonesia is again being 
rocked by social unrest. In August thousands of angry vil-
lagers attacked and destroyed the police station in Pelabu-
han Ratu, West Java. A few weeks later an angry crowd in 
Garut, West Java burned down another police station. In 
Pasuruan, East Java, villagers blocked the main road to 
Surabaya for a whole day to protest against confiscation of 
their land by the Indonesian air force. In Mataram, eastern 
Lombok, villagers destroyed the town hall in Prampuan, 
following a land conflict with the authorities which esca-
lated because of the heavy-handed methods employed by 
the local police. Elsewhere in South Sulawesi, two police 
headquarters were burnt down. 
The worst riot occurr~d in Ujung Pandang, the capital 
of South Sulawesi. For three days anti-Chinese riots swept 
the city leaving at least four dead and over 1,500 buildings 
damaged, including shops, homes and temples; 28 ethnic 
Chinese were wounded and had to be hospitalised. 
The underlying causes of this unrest cannot be directly 
linked to the sudden financial crisis but as the cutbacks 
begin to bite and industries begin to contract, many work-
ers will face dismissal as banks, financial institutions and 
factories close. Suharto's determination to exert tight con-
trol on civil society between now and the forthcoming ses-
sion of the MPR, the upper legislative assembly, when he 
will be appointed for a seventh term as president, could 
founder if, as some commentators predict, the financial 
crisis deepens. * 
continued from page 2 
Right of dismissal 
The new law reinforces the position of management. 
Companies will be able to sack their workers far more eas-
ily than hitherto. When a company closes down, it will be 
allowed to dismiss the entire workforce without severance 
pay. Teten Masduki says, 'This means treating workers as 
a commodity and not as a workforce with fundamental 
rights'. Minimum wages will be set according to what are 
called 'appropriate living conditions', whatever that may 
mean. In a high-cost economy like Indonesia's, where 
companies have to pay countless illegal levies to the mili-
tary and the bureaucracy, 'appropriate living conditions' 
will leave the workers at the bottom of the pile .. 
Many protests 
The labour law brought many groups onto the streets. 
Most protests have taken place outside Parliament or the 
Labour Department. On the day the bill was adopted two 
rival demonstrations were held, both by groups from the 
officib.l union, the FSPSI, indicating that there is a split 
between the rank-and-file and the union bosses. Several 
senior FSPSI officials are members of Parliament and have · 
endorsed the bill. Others, including FSPSI vice-chair Hi-
kayat Atika Kat'Wa, joined the protest, insisting that the 
new law fails to fulfil the aspirations of the workers. 
Those taking part in the protest against the law include 
the Consortium of Migrant Workers Advocates, the 
Women's Group for Labour Justice and a new coalition 
called the National Committee for the Struggle for Democ-
racy (KNP D,, Komite Nasional Perjuangan Demokrasi). * 
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No end to British arms sales 
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook's announcement on 28 July of new arms export licencing criteria 
was a bitter disappointment to those hoping that the Labour Government's ethical foreign policy 
would stop arms sales to Indonesia. The Government failed the litmus test of its new policy by 
ref using to revoke licences· granted last year by the Conservative Government and ref using to ban 
future arms exports. Sadly, as many feared, it is business as usual. 
In announcing the new criteria, Robin Cook said it 
would not be 'realistic or practical' to revoke existing 
licences~ The e~ort of 16 British Aerospace Hawk 
aircraft, worth £160 million, 50 Alvis Scorpion armoured 
vehicles, worth £80 million, and 300 Glover Webb 
armoured vehicles, including seven Tactica water cannon 
will go ahead despite evidence that similar equipment has 
been used for internal repression in Indonesia [see TAPOL 
Bulletins Nos. 139-142, February - August 1997]. 
The announcement provoked an angry response. The 
1 
following day, supporters of T APOL, World Development 
Movement and Campaign Against Arms Trade held a vigil 
and funeral procession (to mark the stillbirth of Labour's 
ethical foreign policy) outside Downing Street and a group 
of MPs presented a letter of protest to Prime Minister Tony 
Blair on behalf of the three organisations. In Parliament, 
the Foreign Secretary was condemned for making the 
announcement in the form of a written answer three days 
before the summer recess instead of in an oral statement 
which could have been questioned in the House. When 
Parliament adjourned for the recess, 148 MPs had signed 
Early Day Motion 201 [see TAPOL Bulletin No. 142, 
August 1997], indicating the strength of feeling against 
continued arms sales to Indonesia. In a further highly 
unusual development, the Portuguese Prime Minister, 
Antonio Guterres, telephoned Tony Blair, to -express his 
government's 'displeasure' at the export of Hawk aircraft, 
which have been used by Indonesia against the former 
Portuguese colony of East Timor. 
The Government has not yet explained why it is not 
'realistic or practical' to revoke the licences. It has the 
legal power to do so and it would probably not have to pay 
compensation. Writing in The Observer, the former 
Liberal Democrat MP, David Alton, rebutted arguments 
about the need to honour existing obligations: 'If British 
weapons are likely to be used for evil purposes, no moral 
duty exists to honour any such agreement,' he said. 
The new licencing criteria 
The Foreign Secretary opened his statement on the new 
arms sales criteria, not with a reference to human rights, 
but with a commitment to a strong defence industry. No 
doubt he was influenced in part by last year's export 
figures, which show that arms sales worth £438 million 
accounted for half the UK's total exports to Indonesia. 
Although the new criteria give 'full weight' to the UK's 
national interests - including, significantly, econorriic, 
financial and commercial interests and the effect on the 
UK's relations with the recipient country - they require the 
Government only to 'take into account' respect for human 
rights. This implies that, in the case of Indonesia, greater 
weight should, for example, be given to Britain's position 
as one of Indonesia's largest foreign investors than to 
Indonesia's human rights record. 
Export licences will not be issued 'if there is a clearly 
identifiable risk that the proposed export might be used for 
internal repression.' This includes 'Equipment where there 
is clear evidence of the recent use of similar equipment for 
internal repression' and 'Equipment which has obvious 
application for internal repression, in cases where the 
recipient country has a significant and continuing record of 
such repression'. [All emphasis added.] Remarkably, 
however, the new criteria allow exports to a country with a 
record -of repression if 'the end-use of the equipment is 
judged to be legitimate, such as protection of members of 
security forces from violence.' 
The Guardian 29 August 1997 
The Government's claim that the new criteria are tighter 
is questionable, especially as. the new 'national interests' 
~uideline provid~s a conv.!?nient excuse for granting a 
hcence. There ts an apparent shift in emphasis in that 
licences will not be grarlted where equipment might be 
used for internal repression; the previous criteria referred to 
equipment likely to be used for internal repression. In both 
cases, however, the formula is in~.!rpreted subjectively, and 
the qualifications in the new criteria allow them to be 
interpreted with considerable laxity. 
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What, for example, is meant by 'a clearly identifiable 
risk ' and 'clear evidence ', and how will such risks and 
evidence be assessed? In June, T APOL sent to Robin 
Cook a video of a BBC news report from 20 May showing 
a British water cannon breaking up a demonstration by the 
United Democratic Party (PPP). The report showed 
security forces wearing gas masks and demonstrators 
rubbing their eyes and putting their hands over their 
mouths after being sprayed by the water cannon, indicating 
that chemicals had been added to the water. Robin Cook's 
office responded with a letter which dismissed the video 
evidence as 'allegations', which would be 'considered if 
we receive any application in future for export of similar 
equipment' . If this wholly inadequate response is typical, 
there can be little hope that the new criteria will lead to 
stricter controls on arms exports. 
The fundamental problem with the new criteria (as with 
the old) is that they cannot be objectively tested and legally 
enforced. In any event, the effect of the recent High Court 
ruling on TAPOL's judicial review application [see 
TAPOL Bulletins Nos. 140 & 141, April & July 1997] is 
that the criteria will count for nothing if the Government 
decides that exports to Indonesia should be allowed in view 
of 'overall foreign policy considerations'. 
Arms exports to escalate? 
So far, the Government has offered no real hope that 
future licence applications will be rejected. It has 
steadfastly insisted that all applications will be considered 
on a case by case basis and refused to discuss the specific 
application of the new criteria, beyond saying t~at internal 
security equipment, such as armoured personnel carriers, 
will be · considered particularly carefully. 
arms contract 
The Government has not ruled out the sale of more 
Hawk aircraft. On the contrary, officials have tried to pre-
empt criticism of future sales by stating there is no 
evidence that the aircraft are being used in East Timor 
(whether or not Hawks are now being used in East Timor is 
of course irrelevant). In May, the Indonesian press 
reported discussions for the purchase by Indonesia of 18 
more Hawks, which 'will not be hampered by the change 
in the British government'. 
Another possible deal involves the sale of Piranha class 
mini-submarines made by GEC Marine. The Piranha is 
designed to support attacks on land targets by covert 
special forces and is capable of discreet surveillance and 
counter-insurgency operations. 
Arms sales linked to investments 
Following Robin Cook's visit to Indonesia from 29-30 
August, the Financial Times reported that the Goven:u?ent 
will shortly grant licences for. a range of m~htary 
equipment, including air defence systems an.d, art~llery, 
provided that it wiIJ be used to protect Indonesia s o_il and 
gas industry, principally the giant Na~na gasfi~ld 1~ the 
South China Sea. British officials beheve that it will be 
possible to defend further sales to Indonesia on this basis. 
The Natuna gasfield, which lies between the Malay 
peninsula and Kalimantan has 4? .trillion cubic !~et of 
estimated reserves valued at $42 bilhon. Not surpnsmgly, 
British industry is bidding for billions of pounds worth of 
contracts linked to Natuna, although the exploration rights 
are owned by the US oil companies, Exxon and Mobil and 
Indonesia's state oil company, Pertamina. The UK 
company, Premier Oil, already has interests in the area. 
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has 
emphasised 'its firm resolve to ensure that UK firms are 
we!J to the fore when Natuna moves ahead,' while AMEC, 
the UK construction group, which is already well 
established in Indonesia and has been asked to organise the 
construction consortium, said: 'Natuna represents one of 
the biggest investment opportunities in the world.' 
In April 1996, Lord Fraser, a Minister of State at the 
DTI, on a visit to Indonesia to discuss matters including 
possible Natuna contracts, was accompanied by senior 
executives from the defence companies British Aerospace, 
GEC and Rolls Royce, and other companies, such as 
AMEC, BICC, British Steel, Cable and Wireless, Costain 
and R.acal Electronics. In February 1997, representatives 
of AMEC, Trafalgar House, GEC and Rolls Royce 
attended a briefing in Jakarta on the Natuna project by 
Indonesian Research and Technology Minister, BJ Habibie. 
One of the less-publicised objectives of the arms trade 
and British foreign policy is to protect British commercial 
interests and to guarantee continued access to Third World 
resources, whatever the human rights implications. In 
countries such as Indonesia, this is achieved in part by 
providing security forces with equipment to suppress 
popular movements which challenge vested political and 
economic interests and to protect particular investments 
such as those in the Natuna area. The attempt by British 
officials to present the latter as a worthy justification for 
exporting arms to Indonesia must be strongly resisted. 
Cook and Alatas discuss arms sales 
Robin Cook's recent visit to Indonesia featured 'very 
frank' talks with Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas. But Cook 
was very careful not to rule out future arms sales, saying 
only that the new criteria will be applied to Indonesia on 
the same basis as any other country and that no decision 
has been made regarding future exports. 
Alatas attempted to put pressure on Cook by rejecting 
the link between arms sales and human rights and 
threatening to 'look elsewhere' for equipment denied by 
Britain. It may be possible for him to find alternative 
suppliers now, but Indonesia will eventually run out of 
options. Despite Alatas's bluff, a ban on British arms 
exports would be a significant blow to the Indonesian 
regime in view of the recent cancellation of a deal to 
purchase American F-16 warplanes and the bans on the 
export of American armoured vehicles and small and light 
arms [see TAPOL Bulletin No. 141, July 1997]. * 
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Cook prevented from meeting Pakpahan 
During a visit to Indonesia in August, the British For-
eign Secretary, Robin Cook was prevented from visiting 
the independent trade union leader, Muchtar Pakpahan in 
hospital. Pakpahan chairs the SBSI and is on trial for sub-
version; he has been hospitalised for six months suffering 
from a variety of ailments. The Indonesian authorities have 
refused his request to go abroad for treatment that is un-
available in Indonesia. 
Robin Cook in Jakarta giving conflicting signals 
The Foreign Secretary had announced his intention to 
meet the union leader before leaving London but the 
meeting was cancelled on the insistence of the Indonesian 
authorities. Acting chair of the union, Tohap Simanungkalit 
told T APOL that Pakpahan had not been informed of the 
cancellation, nor had journalists who were at the hospital to 
cover the event. T APOL has written to Robin Cook ex-
pressing dismay at the cancellation and saying the Pakpa-
han is owed an apology 
The Foreign Secretary announced a six-point human 
rights initiative. It includes a plan to train Indonesian police 
officers which is totally unacceptable to TAPOL (see arti-
cle on the Indonesian police elsewhere in this Bulletin). He 
also announced plans to provide support for human rights 
groups, including the government-appointed National Hu-
man Rights Commission. 
He later held a 15-minute meeting with several human 
rights NGOs at the request of T APOL. The activists pres-
ent were Gunawan Muhammad, former editor of the 
banned magazine, TEMPO who also chairs the election 
monitoring group KIPP, Bambang Widjoyanto, director of 
the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation, Tohap Simanungka-
lit representing SBSI and Bonar Tigor Naipospos of PI-
JAR. Although the meeting was so brief, those present 
were able to convey to the Foreign Secretary their opposi-
tion to arms sales for the Indonesian armed forces, 
Gunawan also criticised plans to train the Indonesian po-
lice, saying there was not a shred of evidence that past 
courses had made any difference to a force dedicated to 
the use of violence in the protection of the State. 
His initiative on East Timor and his failure to take ac-
tion on arms sales to Indonesia are reported elsewhere in 
this Bulletin. * 
ARMED FORCES 
New Law sanctions excessive police powers 
A controversial Police Law passed by the Indonesian Parliament on 8 September gives unprece-
dented powers to the police, but does nothing to curb police brutality, and fails to address the fun-
damental problem concerning the police's role as part of the armed forces (ABRI). Meanwhile, 
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook's attempt to boost his image as a champion of human rights by of-
fering police training on crowd control techniques is a disgrace and doomed to failure. 
The new Police Law has_ been widely criticised, 
especially by lawyers organisations, for failing to end the 
culture of violence which permeates the force. Although 
the draft bill was amended to exclude an article that would 
actually have allowed police to use violence during 
interrogations, 'a number of very basic problems still 
remain,' said Barn bang Widjoyanto, director of the 
Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHJ). The Law gives 
the police excessive authority to use violence in the 
absence of a clear, controlling body, and 'If the state is 
given such power, it would be prone to human rights 
violations,' he said. 
The Law allows the police to use force and arms in self 
defence, which begs the question of what is self defence. 
Many of the recent extra-judicial killings by the police (see 
below) have been justified on the grounds of self defence. 
An article which allowed the police to disperse mass 
gatherings was also deleted from the bill, but its removal is 
unlikely to deter them. The unrest on 27 July last year was 
sparked off by a police-led raid on a gathering of Indone-
sian Democratic Party (PD!) supporters, while in North 
Sumatra, a network of NGOs are suing the police for 
breaking up their annual general meeting in June this year. 
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In any event, the Law allows the police free reign to 
take measures 'based on their own considerations,' when 
necessary. 
As if to confirm that the police can commit human 
rights violations with virtual impunity, the Law focuses 
only on violations committed by the general public, with-
out referring to abuses committed by officials. Provisions 
on a police code of ethics, pre-trial hearings and the disci-
plinary powers of senior officers are completely inade-
quate. It is known, for example, that almost every com-
plaint about police behaviour made at the pre-trial stage has 
The second instructed officers on the bullets they should 
use. Bullets were colour coded according to whether they 
were blank, rubber or live. Soldiers and police would de-
cide on the spot when to start shooting. 
been rejected by the courts. 
=:::::;::;;:;;~;;;;:- ~--....-----
Asked to comment, the then army chief of staff, 
General Hartono, denied that the policy was for the period 
of the election. 'The shoot-on-sight order applies for all 
kinds of unrest, before as well as after the election,' he 
said. Chief of Police, General Dibyo Widodo said that 
operations involving shootings would be considered as 
police operations, even though other forces may be 
involved. Emphasising the importance of impunity, he 
added: 'Anyone who shoots people during a disturbance 
will be protected by the law.' 
~~~~~~~---==°'~= 
Anti-riot Police: modern gear to commit more brutalities 
The fundamental problem which the Law does not ad-
dress is the lack of civilian control over the police. Law-
yers insist that the police must be separated from ABRI be-
cause of tb~ir basic philosophical differences. The police 
force protects and defends the community, while the mili-
tary deals with enemy forces, they point out. 
The UN Special Rapporteur on Extra Judicial, Sum-
mary and Arbitrary Executions, in his report on his mission 
to Indonesia and East Timor in July 1994, called on the 
Indonesian Government to establish a civilian police force 
as a matter of urgency. Until that is done, police violence 
will remain institutionalised and will probably worsen in 
line with this year's appalling trend. 
'Shoot-on-sight' policy 
Shortly before the Indonesian general election on 29 
May, ABRI personnel, including the police, were given 
instructions to 'shoot-on-sight' anyone disrupting the cam-
paign. According ,to the fortnightly journal, Forum 
Keadilan, ABRI issued two manuals entitled, 'Procedures 
on Defending the Legal Position of Officers in their Han-
dling of Unrest', and 'Procedures regarding Loading Am-
munition and the Use of Firearms'. The first aimed to en-
sure that officers would be protected against legal action 
should they be responsible for civilian injuries or deaths. 
In other words, to ensure that they could act with impunity. 
Police brutality worsens 
It was probably not necessary for ABRI 
to adopt its 'shoot-on-sight' policy, since 
in practice such a policy - or, more accu-
rately, a 'shoot-to-kill' policy - already 
existed and was being vigorously imple-
mented by the police, particularly against 
criminal suspects. In April, the Jakarta 
Post reported that 32 people had been shot 
dead by the Jakarta police since the New 
Year. That compared to 46 killings in the 
whole of 1996. In Surabaya, Indonesia's 
second largest city, 28 were killed between 
January and March. The figure has risen 
dramatically since. It is believed that 70 
had been killed by July. The Sinar weekly 
magazine put the figure even higher, re-
porting that 110 suspected criminals were 
shot dead in the Greater Jakarta area be-
tween January and April. 
The police frequently justify the kill-
ings by saying that they acted in self de-
fence, that the suspect was resisting arrest, 
that they initially fired warning shots into 
the air, and that all shootings are 'carried out according to 
procedures'. Curiously, shootings often take place after a 
suspect is asked by the police to locate his accomplices, 
and many suspects are shot in the back. 
Although some shot suspects were under arrest for vio-
lent crimes such as robbery, many alleged crimes were 
relatively minor, such as car thefts. In June, a man was 
sho~ and wounded after resisting arrest on a charge of 
buymg stolen goods. In July, a suspected vehicle thief was 
gunned d9wn after he jumped out of a police car. In 
August, a man was shot in the leg and back and died after 
trying to escape when asked by the police to locate his ac-
complices involved in a series of shopping centre thefts. 
The killings are _ defended by high-ranking officials, 
even by members of the National Commission on Human 
Rights ~Komnas Ham). Jakarta police chief, Maj. Gen. 
Hamam1 Nata, has told officers to shoot if they feel at all 
threatened. ' 'If the criminal reacts and threatens officers 
just .shoot,' he said: According to Komnas Ham's DeputY 
Chairman, ~arzuk1 Darus~an, the 'shoot-on-sight' policy 
does not v10late human rights. 'The criminals violated 
other people's right to safety,' he said. 
Deaths resulting from ill treatment and torture in cus-
tody are also common. In April, a Surabaya dockworker 
was beaten to death by the police after he failed to produce 
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his identity card. In June, police in Ujungpandang, South 
Sulawesi, were accused of beating a man to death after he 
spent a night in the police cells. But, virtual impunity still 
applies. In July, a policeman from Bandung was sentenced 
to a mere nine months and 10 days in prison for the fatal 
torture of a robbery suspect. 
Support from Robin Cook 
President Suharto is engaged in a public relations ex-
ercise to present the police as the moderate defenders of 
internal security, and he received unexpected support for 
this from Robin Cook during his trip to Indonesia at the 
end of August. In an ill-advised attempt to counter criti-
cism of his decision to allow the export to Indonesia of 
Hawk aircraft, armoured vehicles and water cannon, Cook 
unveiled a six-point plan for improving human rights, 
which included a series of lectures by senior British police 
officers on effective and non-confrontational crowd control 
at demonstrations. 
It is indefensible for Britain to try and legitimise, 
through training, the brutal, para-military Jndonesian police 
force at the same time as supplying it with arms. The In-
dependent on Sunday columnist, Joan Smith, suggested 
that if we are going to help the Indonesian police control 
demonstrations against the regime's brutal practices at 
home and in East Timar, we might as well begin selling 
swords to the Saudis, as long as a few lessons in humane 
beheading are thrown in free. 
There is also the question of the extent to which Britain 
is unwittingly assisting Suharto in· his propaganda and po -
continued from page 18 
pletely abandoned. Many refugees 'disappeared' by min-
gling among the more than a million Indonesian migrants 
in Malaysia. But hundreds were detained by the Malaysian 
authorities. 
Recent reports from the Acehnese Refugee Committee 
(ARC), a committee set up by the Acehnese community in 
Malaysia, estimates that about 400 Acehnese have been 
detained in the last two years by the Malaysian authorities. 
A number of those detained have been forcibly returned to 
Indonesia. Nothing is known about what happened to them. 
Protest in the Lenggeng depot 
The Acehnese refugees are detained in several so-called 
immigration depots, another name for a prison camp. Con-
ditions can be very harsh, depending on the behaviour of 
the Malaysian officials. On 28 August, 143 Acehnese refu-
gees detained in blocks A, B, C and D took action, they 
broke down the zinc fence and held a protest outside the 
compound. They demanded to meet UNHCR officials, 
members of the ARC and their lawyers. The action went on 
for two days. On 30 August they peacefully went back to 
their barracks. It turns out that Malaysian police had con-
ducted a round-up and seized a flag of Aceh Merdeka, the 
Independent State of Aceh. This had been the reason for 
their action. 
Letter to the Malaysian authorities 
On 28 August, the Acehnese Refugee Committee wrote 
a four-page report to the Malaysian Deputy Minister for 
Internal Affairs, Datuk Tajul Rosli Ghazali, a copy of 
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litical machinations concerning the armed forces. Suharto 
has instructed the police to take the lead in handling civil 
unrest so that security measures taken against unarmed ci-
vilians look better. At the same time, boosting the police 
gives the impression of a move away from military rule to 
civilian rule. It is also argued by political analysts that the 
shift towards a greater role for the police is part of an over-
all strategy designed by Suharto to counter the decreasing 
loyalty of large sections of the army [see TAPOL Bulletin 
No. 139, February 1997]. 
In reality, the army remains present at major street 
demonstrations and will step in without hesitation. It is 
doubted whether the police force is able to handle unrest on 
its own as it is declining in numbers and is not as well 
trained and equipped as the army. The supply of arms, the 
provision of police training, and the general respectability 
Robin Cook is giving to the police is, therefore, a consider-
able bonus to Suharto and shows a failure to understand 
that the police force, as presently constituted, is part of the 
problem and not part of the solution. 
Robin Cook has also forgotten that Britain spent over 
ten years in the 1980s and 1990s training Indonesian police 
officers under the aid programme without any discernible 
impact on their human rights record [see TAPOL Bulletin 
No. 139, February 1997]. Instead of offering lectures on 
crowd control, he should speak out in support of the right 
to assembly and revoke all licences for the export of re-
pressive crowd-control equipment. * 
ACEH 
which was sent to TAPOL. It covers incidents between 
Malaysian security officials and Acehnese detainees going 
back to December 1996. 
The report deals with sixteen serious cases, all involv-
ing ill-treatment by the Malaysian authorities. Twice in 
December 1996, refugees were forced to return to Indone-
sia. The first occurred 0!1 3 December when sixteen 
Acehnese activists were forced to board a vessel at Penang 
Harbour. They were badly treated by the authorities. Dur-
ing the journey home they took control of the ferry and 
forced the captain to return to Malaysia, threatening to sink 
the ship. On arrival back in Port Penang they were locked 
up in the Juru Immigration Depot in Penang. It is feared 
that one of the sixteen, Muhammad Nasir bin Adam lost his 
life as his whereabouts are not known. 
On Christmas eve there was a similar incident at the 
Langkap Immigration Depot in Perak, involving 53 
Acehnese detainees, also to be deported by the authorities. 
A clash was unavoidable and the Acehnese were con-
fronted by more than 200 Federal Reserve Unit policemen. 
The bloody incident lasted the whole morning. In the end 
the 53, many of whom had sustained injuries, managed to 
postpone their deportation. They were split up in three 
groups and sent to different immigration depots. Two 
months later Abdul Karim bin Muhammad Ali, one of the 
53, died at Malacca General Hospital of haemorrhage of 
the lung from being beaten during the fight. * 
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More trouble at Freeport/Rio Tinto mine 
Protest has erupted yet again in Timika, West Papua, in the continuing conflict between the mining 
giant Freeport/Rio Tinto, and the tribal peoples whose land was stolen to exploit the fabulous re-
serves of copper and gold. Two people were killed in mysterious circumstances in a road accident 
and two more were shot dead by Indonesian troops. Six thousand troops are in the area to protect 
the mine and crush simmering discontent. A brief visit by the National Human Rights Commission 
did nothing to alleviate the tension. 
ABRI, the guardians of Freeport 
The Indonesian armed forces (ABRI) have acknowl-
edged the depth of hostility towards the copper-and-gold 
mine in and around the Freeport citadel by creating a spe-
cial Task Force to Safeguard a Vital Object in Timika 
(Satgas Pam Obvit), the only one of its kind to exist any-
where in Indonesia. The headquarters of the Task Force 
was set up last December when ABRI commander-in-chief 
General Feisal Tanjung visited Timika in the company of 
an array of top brass from the army and the police. General 
Tanjung announced at the time that, ABRI has never 
throughout its history had such a concentration of armed 
power in a single sub-district. He also announced the crea-
tion of an army sub-district command (kodim) and a police 
sub-district command (po/res) with headquarters at Mile 
28, on the access road to the mine's headquarters in Tem-
bagapura. In addition, ABRI will build bases for the air 
force and the navy i~ Amamapare. 
'ABRI believes that Timika has the potential to become 
the major growth area in the region. It therefore needs army 
and police commands at the sub-district level in order to 
safeguard security and crush any disturbances that may 
occur.' [Suara Pembaruan, 27 December 1996] 
To further bolster ABRl's presence, it was announced 
in September that six tank units landed at Freeport's har-
bour, Portsitetogether with 34 members of the Tank Attack 
command. These forces are described as the embryo of a 
Tank Detachment of the Trikora Military Command. 
[Suara Pembaruan, 9 September] Well might we ask, why 
bring tanks to Timika? Certainly not to fight the OPM in 
the bush or chase anti-Freeport demonstrators. Perhaps the 
tanks will be used to give a greater sense of security to the 
tens of thousands of Indonesian immigrants who now in-
habit new urban areas like Kuala Kencana. Timika is now 
being described as the 'fastest growing region in Indone-
sia'. The chances of hostilities erupting between these out-
siders and the uprooted local communities should not be 
under-estimated. 
Freeport publicly acknowledges that is paying for ABRI 
facilities. Its spokesman Ed Pressman said recently that the 
company is building a new barracks for ABRI, adding that 
after the barracks had been completed, it would 'no longer 
supply ABRI with support of any kind'. [Sydney Morning 
Herald, 19 September] 
The man in charge of security in Timika and throughout 
the province of Irian Jaya is Major-General Johnny Lu-
mintang, who hails from the army's elite corps, Kopassus, 
and who previously held the post of army commander in 
East Timor. Lumintang was very much in evidence in 
Timika, overseeing the security response, throughout the 
latest disturbances there. 
Huge expansion planned 
The latest unrest in Timika occurred against the back-
ground of the mining company's plans to vastly increase 
resource throughput at the mine, more than doubling tail-
ings dumped from 120,000 to 300,000 metric tons per day. 
'The scale of these operations is mind-boggling,' writes 
mining activist Danny Kennedy. 'In word pictures, Free-
port already dumps the equivalent of two and a half million 
50kg people over the edge of the mine site every day into 
the Ajkwa River system. Now they want to expand this to a 
six million body count.' The current level of operations has 
already resulted in massive degradation of the downstream 
catchment into which this waste rock is dumped. 'The 
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sediment has choked the Ajkwa as it enters into the slow 
flat river bends of the lowlands and caused it to breach its 
bank. Muddy water - unfit to drink even by the provincial 
government reckoning - has sheeted eastwards into the 
watershed drowning as much as 50 square kms of produc-
tive rainforest. Over the remaining life of the mine. Free-
port estimates it will drown 130kms.' [See Down to Earth, 
No 34, August 1997] 
Company access road blockaded 
When renewed disturbances erupted on 21 August, the 
local army and police commands initially appear to have 
been caught napping, and planeloads of troop reinforce-
ments were flown in to regain control of the company's 
access road as local people set up a blockade. 
Jim-Bob Moffett, Freeport's CEO special relationship with 
the Indonesian regime is sealed with the prestigious Satya 
Lencana Wirakarya Medal of Merit fromPresident Suharto. 
The trouble erupted just before the second annual dis-
bursement of Freeport's 1 % Trust Fund was about to be 
paid out in August. The Fund was created last year, after 
widespread disruption of the mine's operations earlier in 
the -year: following a series of human rights atrocities 
linked to the mine. Rejecting demands for the company to 
acknowledge the local people's land rights, Freeport 
thought it could buy them off with a meagre share of the 
company's colossal profits. 
Just before the second disbursement was due, local 
church leaders warned that it could trigger new tensions 
and pleaded with the authorities to re-consider the scheme. 
They pointed out that the Amungme and Kamoro peoples 
who have the strongest claim to the land had been largely 
ignored in favour of other tribes with no entitlement. J?is-
bursement had triggered jealousies, conflict and even tnbal 
warfare between and within tribes . The churchmen urged 
the Indonesian government and the company to enter into 
dialogue with Amungme and Kamoro leaders to work out 
an agreed re-assessment of the Fund and warned that new 
conflicts could emerge. But their pleading fell on deaf ears. 
In fact, the Amungme and Kamoro people have never a~­
cepted the Fund as a way of compensating the~ for their 
egregious losses and accuse the company of fa1lmg to ac-
knowledge or respect their legitimate rights to the res?urces 
now being exploited. Moreover the Fund has been imple-
mented without properly consulting the rightful owners. 
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The use to which the money is put is determined by the 
local administration for investment in a development plan 
that is dictated by military needs in the region. Moreover, 
the sum total, about $15 million a year is less than half of 
what Freeport's chief executive, Jim-Bob Moffett alone 
earns as salary. [Down to Earth, No 34, August 1997] 
Hardly had the churchmen issued their warning than a 
thousand tribesmen from several tribes blocked the access 
road linking the mine in Tembagapura to Timika and Port-
site on the coast; they hijacked an excavator and dug deep 
holes, hoping to make the road impassable. This outburst of 
fury came in the wake of a serious accident the previous 
day when four young West Papuans on their way to a cul-
tural event in Timika were given a lift by a passing vehicle 
owned by Freeport. Instead of taking them to Timika, the 
driver suddenly veered in the opposite direction, driving 
towards Tembagapura. Terrified that their lives might be at 
risk, two of the young people managed to jump out of the 
van, injuring themselves quite badly; the bodies of the 
other two were later found abandoned by the roadside. The 
two victims were later named as Akulian Kotouki, aged 17, 
and Nela Pakage aged 16. As with other unexplained inci-
dents, the company was suspected of being responsible in 
some way for the young people's deaths. 
In London, the head office of Rio Tinto was quick to 
deny culpability on behalf of Freeport, seeking to suggest 
that the victims had been murdered by members of their 
own clan. It issued a statement alleging that the two victims 
bore wounds 'not consistent with a vehicle accident' and 
that ' they were both hit on the back of the neck with a 
club', adding: 'It is reported that this is a typical Ikari (sic) 
style method of retribution. ' 
Two shot dead 
With tensions running high on the next day and more 
troops pouring in to end the blockade, army and police 
special forces surrounded Harahap Village in Kwamki 
Lama to quell a conflict between groups from the Moni 
tribe who were in dispute over the share-out of the Trust 
Fund. Fighting broke out between onlookers and truckloads 
of troops who were being driven into the area. As they 
alighted, soldiers armed with rifles and wielding batons hit 
out at the people along the road, seriously injuring at least 
seven people. 
Meanwhile eight Ekari people who were marching in a 
crowd in the direction of Timika Airport were set upon, 
beaten up· and driven off in a truck. After being held for a 
day, they were released. At the same time, the inhabitants 
of Desa Harapan were out in forc·e, demanding that the 
local army and police investigate the incident that had 
killed two young people from their community. As they 
were marching towards the police command headquarters, 
a crowd of youngsters split away from the crowd and 
walked towards the spot where their two friends had died. 
Soldiers who were out in force guarding the spot started 
shooting at the youngsters, who responded · by throwing 
stones and other missiles. The soldiers then fired directly 
into the crowd, killing Stevanus Tekege, 23, who was shot 
in the head, and fatally wounding Timotius Koga, who was 
shot in the stomach. Many others were beaten up and in-
jured in the fighting that ensued. 
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Funeral rites abused 
The Ekari people were now mourning the deaths of four 
young people. Initially they wanted to postpone the funer-
als, hoping that members of the National Human Rights 
Commission would visit Timika quickly to investigate the 
circumstances in which the four had died. But they 
changed their minds and buried the bodies close to their 
homes in Desa Harapan. However, in contravention of tra-
dition, the bodies were later removed and reburied in the 
Timika public cemetery, apparently so as to prevent others 
from visiting their graves to pay homage. 
LEMASA plea to Rights Commission 
The terrible events led the Amungme Tribal Council, 
LEMASA, to send a document to the National Commission 
of Human Rights in Jakarta, pleading with them to send a 
mission immediately, not only to investigate the ~e~ent 
tragic events but also to investigate a number of kll~mgs 
and atrocities over a two-year period. The statement hsted 
incidents that have involved Freeport personnel. It argued 
that the government and ABRI regard everything in terms 
of safeguarding security, the so-called 'security approach'. 
Because Freeport is regarded as a 'vital national project', 
the government is biased towards the company to the det-
riment of the people. The huge armed presence of ap-
pcoximately 6,000 people has caused amiiety and depres-
sion among local people. It complains that a number of the 
Commission's recommendations from its previous visit in 
1995 have not been implemented and attacks Freeport for 
failing to acknowledge or respect the Amungme and 
Kamoro as the rightful owners of the natural resources 
which are currentLy being exploited and complains of 
'inhuman behaviour by company employees, especially 
non-Irianese, towards the local community such as chasing 
off every trespass onto its concession which have resulted 
in hard feelings and hatred (towards the company).' 
It calls for: 
• regular monitoring by the Commission of the human 
rights situation at the operation site of Freeport and 
generally throughout Mimika; 
• a reduction in the military presence in the region; 
• a more thorough investigation of the human rights 
situation in the past two years in and around the 
operational site of the mine which would require 
the cooperation of Freeport 
Timika a 'no-go area' for Commission. 
The Commission's response was to send a three-man 
team, not to investigate anything but merely to 'familiarise 
itself with the surroundings. 'We're making the visit be-
cause of the local people's expectations,' said deputy chair, 
Marzuki Darusman. We made the 1995 visit because there 
were reported violations of human rights that we needed to 
probe, while tomorrow) is just a friendly visit.' [Jakarta 
Post, 30 August] 
The Commission members were in the area for just 36 
hours and spoke to only one witness of the incidents th.at 
need to be scrutinised. They had no time to meet other wit-
nesses who were present at a meeting between the team 
and LEMASA. Much of the time was spent listening to the 
version of the police and the army. Speaking to the press 
after a meeting with military commander Major-Gener~) 
Johnny Lumintang, Darusman said that the events m 
Timika had nothing to do with any conflict between Fr~e­
port and the local community; th~ problem was l~cal dis-
satisfaction with the way in which the company s Trust 
Fund was being distributed. He even claimed that the ~c­
tions taken the security forces during the three days of dis-
turbances was 'reasonable'. [Suara Pembaruan, 2 Septem-
ber] t 
It is worth recalling that when the Commission sent a 
team of investigation to Timika in 1995, there was dissatis-
faction that it had not dealt with Freeport's involvement. 
They made an undertaking at the time to visit Timika a 
second time but never did so. 
Two more victims of ABRI brutality 
On 11 September, Yapens/Rony Imingkawak Magai 
from Harapan Village, K wamki Lama was fatally wounded 
after being beaten by four members of the special police 
force, Brimob, and three Freeport security officers. He had 
taken a bus to Tembagapura to visit his brother Tadius who 
works for Freeport. He arrived at his brother's house the 
next day, handcuffed and in very bad shape. He was taken 
to a Freeport hospital at Mile 68 but died soon after. His 
body was covered in bruises inflicted by heavy clubs, while 
there were blood clots in his brain and stomach. Although 
his family were told that the incident would be investi-
gated, they doubt whether anything will happen. 
Four days later, two Danis, Agus Tabani, 26, and Weni 
Tabani, 25, were eating lunch by the Iwaka river, on their 
way out to hunt. There were many soldiers in the area. 
They were both hit when a bomb suddenly exploded. Weni 
died instantly. Agus was wounded in the face, arm and 
thigh. 
At first the family of the dead man said they would 
carry his body to the district chiefs office to complain 
about what the army had done but they later changed their 
minds, saying: 'There's nothing we can do. Everyone 
knows what ABRI is up to. They kill us like animals. If we 
protest, more people will be murdered. We will bury our 
brother quietly and pray to God to prevail on ABRI to stop 
the killing.' * 
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Mandela takes th,e initiative 
East Timor's righteous struggle gained new recognition when Nelson Mandela announced his in-
tention to help bring about an early solution to the question. The President of South Africa had a 
two-hour meeting with resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao, at the State guest-house in Jakarta and 
later wrote to President Suharto, urging him to release the resistance leader as a crucial step towards 
solving the East Timor question. 
The talks between Xanana Gusmao, often referred to as 
East Timor's Mandela, and the former Robben Island pris-
oner who now leads South Africa, took place while Nelson 
Mandela was on a State visit to Jakarta. Xanana was taken 
from his cell in Cipimmg Prison to have dinner and talks 
with President Mandela on 15 July. Nothing was known 
about the encounter until it was leaked ·by a Jakarta weekly. 
Although the regime persists in referring to Xanana as 'a 
criminal', the fact that President Suharto felt compelled to 
respond positively to Mandela's request for a meeting, af-
ter initially saying no, is in fact acknowledgement of 
Xanana' s standing as leader of the East Timorese resis-
tance with a crucial role to play in seeking a solution to the 
question of East Timor. Just before departing for his visit 
to Jakarta, Mandela was quoted· as saying that East Timor 
was being talked about 'in every corner of the globe'. 
Nelson Mandela in a bright Batik shirt with the host Suharto 
1 
There is little doubt that Mandela alone, of all world 
leaders, could have prevailed upon Suharto to permit a 
meeting with Xanana. The two men have met frequently 
since Mandela was released in February 1990. Mandela is 
known to have accepted financial assistance from the In-
donesian dictator on at least one occasion and relations 
between the two countries have flourished in the past few 
years. South Africa takes over the presidency of the Non-
Aligned Movement in 1998 and is also keen to win a seat 
on the UN Security Council. 
As one South African daily commented: 'The unex-
pected meeting between the world's most admired head of 
state and a leader of one of its most popular liberation or-
ganisations of the 1990s, at a state guest house a stone's 
throw from the presidential palace in Jakarta, has as much 
potential as anything to break the logjam.' [Gerry van 
Klinken in the Darwin-based Australasia] 
After returning to South Africa, Mandela invited Portu-
guese President Jorge Sampaio, Prime Minister Antonio 
Guterres, and Nobel Prize laureates Jose Ramos-Horta and 
Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo to South Africa to in-
form them of his intentions. It was also announced that 
Mandela had written to President Suharto calling for the 
release of Xanana Gusmao. For about a week, confusion 
surrounded the whereabouts of his letter as it appears that 
South African officials had failed to send it to the Indone-
sian embassy in Pretoria for transmission to Jakarta. Hop-
ing to cast Portugal in a bad light, Jakarta alleged that the 
Portuguese embassy in Pretoria, which had also been sent a 
copy, had leaked the letter to the press and prevailed upon 
the South African authorities to expel the Portuguese am-
bassador. Lisbon's measured response to this diplomatic 
slight - by refraining from retaliating - ensured that the 
Mandela initiative stayed on track. 
Mandela has stressed that his efforts are strictly within 
the UN process under the auspices of UN Secretary Gen-
eral, Kofi Annan. Suharto is due to visit South Africa in 
November thi~ year, when it is expected that East Timor 
will be the major talking point. A recent suggestion by 
Mandela that autonomy might be the solution has led some 
to wonder whether he realises the implications of such an 
idea. The CNRM Peace Plan makes provision for auton-
omy as a transitional stage, after which a UN-supervised 
referendum would have to be held. 
Xanana's response 
Speaking on several occasions after the historic meeting 
with Mandela, Xanana said: 'I was greatly honoured. It 
means our struggle is being respected and acknowledged.' 
As for the-proposal that he be released, it became clear that 
Jakarta might consider this only as the precursor to depor-
tation; In Xanana's own words: 'If I wanted to, I could 
have been out of jail years ago. I am much more use stay-
ing in jail. If I went into exile, then the meaning of this 
struggle would be lost.' [Sydney Morning Herald, 12 Sep-
tember] 
In the event, Suharto refused to release the East 
Timorese leader. Instead, the authorities thought they 
would make a gesture by granting him three months' re-
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mission on the occasion of Indonesian Independence Day, 
to which Xanana responded contemptuously, as being 
'irrelevant'. 
World leaders appeal to Suharto 
Nobel Peace Laureates and eminent persons from 
around the world, attending Forum 2000 in Prague at the 
invitation of President Vaclav Havel called on President 
Suharto to give 'your fullest support to the efforts of the 
UN Secretary General and of President Mandela, towards a 
speedy resolution of the East Timor conflict'. The signato-
ries included Richard von Weiszacker, a former German 
president, Oscar Arias Sanchez, a forner prt.3ident of 
Costa Rica, and Willem De Klerk, a former president of 
South Africa. Gareth Evans, former Australian Foreign 
Minister, who signed and sealed the Timor Gap Treaty 
with Indonesia in 1989, was also among the signatories. 
The statement described President Mandela's initiative 
on East Timor as being 'of great significance', adding: 
'The developing world, and Indonesia in particular, should 
play a leadership role in resolving tragic conflicts such as 
in East Timor that have claimed so many lives. Indonesia 
itself has had its share of loss of life in East Timor.' 
Robin Cook also wants to help 
During his two-day visit to Indonesia at the end of 
August, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook made a point of 
calling Bishop Belo by phone soon after arriving in Jakarta 
to discuss the situation in East Timor. He later told the 
press that Belo had said the human rights situation was 
'hardening' and also talked of the need for a reduction in 
the number of Indonesian troops. 
Cook later annoonced that during the UK's presidency 
of the European Union in the first half of 1998, he would 
propose that the EU send a Troika ambassadorial mission 
to East Tim or 'to hear the views of the mass of the popula-
tion and to be more fully informed of th~ situation in East 
Timor'. In fact, EU countries have so far refused to send 
their ambassadors to East Timor as this might be taken as a 
sign of recognising integration. Cook's proposal would 
only avoid this by stating that the visit does not signify 
recognition. In addition, consulting East Timorese would 
have to take place free from intervention by the forces of 
occupation and with firm safeguards for anyone who 
speaks to the mission. 
Human rights continue to deteriorate 
Meanwhile, although there has been such marked prog-
ress on the international arena regarding East Timor, along 
with the resolution adopted at the UN Human Rights 
Commission in April this year, the human rights situation 
in the country has continued to deteriorate. In its bi-annual 
report for the first half of 1997, published at the end of 
August, the East Timor Human Rights Centre in Mel-
bourne states that there has been 'a marked increase in 
violations, particularly ~tra-judicial executions, arbitrary 
arrests and detentions, and systematic torture and ill-
treatment of prisoners. It is believed at least 707 East 
Timorese were arrested and 49 killed.' These figures are 
more than double the arrests and extra-judicial executions 
reported by the Centre in the whole of 1996. 
Some of the documented killings involve people who 
were murdered in villages or travelling from one part of the 
country to another. For instance, in January a yo_u_n~ 
Timorese was shot and decapitated in the village of Wathh, 
Baucau. His body which was too badly injured to be identi-
fied , was found dumped in an area under the supervision 
of Battalion 745 in Fatumaca. Fernando Lopes, 32, was 
shot in the back in the main street of Comoro about 50 me-
tres from the local police headquarters, on 8 February. On 
23 March, a youth named Marcal was believed to have 
been stabbed to death by security forces during a demon-
stration at Mahkota Hotel, during the visit of UN envoy 
Jamsheed Marker. On 25 April, Alcino da Costa was shot 
by security forces who fired into the air to break up a dis-
pute during a concert organised by GOLKAR's youth 
wing. None of these and many other killings have been 
investigated by the Indonesian authorities. 
The 34-page document, with numerous lists of victims 
and details of incidents provides graphic testimony of the 
random, brutal behaviour of Indonesian soldiers, knowing 
full well that they can act with impunity. The Centre 
stresses the need for a permanent UN presence in East 
Timor, as well as access to the territory for international 
human rights organisations and foreign journalists. 
'International scrutiny and condemnation of Indonesia's 
human rights record must continue if East Timorese people 
are to have any hope of basic human rights denied to them 
for over twenty-one years.' 
Asylum bid at the Austrian embassy 
Six East Timorese whose names have not been made 
public entered the Austrian embassy in Jakarta on 19 Sep-
tember and asked for asylum. This is the first asylum bid at 
a Ja"karta embassy for several months. The six, four of 
whom were a couple and their two children, were taken 
from the embassy within 36 hours and put on board a plane 
for Lisbon. 
Mary Robinson to meet Ali Alatas 
The newly-appointed UN Human Rights Commis-
sioner, Mary Robinson, announced in Geneva that she 
would be meeting Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas 
at the start of the UN General Assembly in New York. This 
will be one of the first moves by the former president of 
Ireland since taking up her post at the beginning of Sep-
tember. · * 
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Aceh still like a war zone 
Aceh is hardly ever mentioned in the press these days. This is more the silence of the grave and the 
belief that no news is good n.ews does not apply to Ac eh. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
From consistent reports received by TAPOLfrom contacts in the region since the beginning of 1997, 
we can conclude that the Indonesian military still treat the region as a war zone. 
Aceh remains arguably the most isolated spot in the In-
donesian archipelago, even more isolated than the other 
two 'trouble spots', East Timor and West Papua. No inde-
pendent observer has been able to conduct investigations 
about the human rights situation in this most westerly part 
ofthe archipelago. 
As in Timika [see separate article] and parts of East 
Timor, ABRI, the Indonesian armed forces, identify these 
regions as 'red zones' or 'trouble hot spots' (the English 
term is used) and treat them accordingly. What it means is 
that the territorial troops are subordinate to the elite troops, 
mostly the notorious Kopassus commandos. 
When Major-General Arifin Tarigan was still com-
mander of Seskoad, the army staff command school, he 
explained what he sees as the differences between the three 
hot spots. East Timor and West Papua became part of the 
Indonesian unitary state at a much latter stage; Aceh on the 
other hand became part of the Indonesian republic from the 
outset. Tarigan then asked why the Acehnese, who were 
renowned for their fierce resistance to the Dutch, have also 
taken up arms against Jakarta. He called on academics at 
the University in Aceh to try to give an answer to this 
question. 
Wilayah operasi militer 
Since the early nineties Aceh has been officially de-
clared a wilayah operasi militer (military operational re-
gion). According to local press reports, the Aceh provincial 
administration is trying to get rid of this label which has 
made life :tough for the Acehnese as it confers almost un-
limited powers on the military. House-to-house searches, 
roadbfocks, regular checking of ID cards and body 
searches make daily life very unpleasant. 
Aceh was the battleground of fierce combat between 
ABRI and GAM, the Free Aceh Movement armed resis-
tance, from 1989 till 1993. It peaked in late 1990 and early 
1991 when ABRI forces brutally applied its 'low intensity 
conflict' strategy by killing thousands of innocent villagers. 
Thousands of villagers were forced to flee to neighbouring 
Malaysia creating a major refugee problem. 
In December 1996 the Acehnese press reported appeals 
by the provincial government, informal leaders, religious 
leaders and prominent academics for an end to the desig-
nation of Aceh as a military operational region. Military 
commander Major General Sedaryanto's response was 
blunt: it was up to the Acehnese community to show that 
they were able to make the region safe and secure. 
From February till April this year, ABRI launched a 
military operation called Operasi Jaring Kikis (Operation 
Network Extermination) resulting in dozens of arrests and 
the confiscation of a large number of weapons. [See TA-
POL Bulletin No.140, April 1997]. No one says a word any 
longer about ending the wilayah operasi militer status. 
Grim situation 
The present situation in Aceh has worsened in the last 
few months; Pidie district has endured a huge influx of 
troops. Since late June, soldiers in full combat dress harass 
people on the streets, checking ID cards and setting up 
roadblocks along the roads from Beureunuen to Guempang 
and from Sigli to Padang Tiji. 
People living in the area have been forced to participate 
in a fence of legs operation, combing the undergrowth in 
search of guerrillas. People often hear gunfire at night but 
with nothing being reported in the press, it is difficult to 
say whether GAM activities have intensified. 
The population have also been forced to participate in 
night patrols known as siskamling (sistim keamanan ling-
kungan, neighbourhood security system). Night patrols are 
rigorously enforced; if a villager dozes off or lacks energy, 
he is subjected to corporal punishment like running round 
the village, doing push-ups and so on. 
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Dubious actions 
There have been several nasty incidents in Pidie. On 28 
May, a shoot-out took place in the village of Jiem-Jiem. 
The subdistrict head of Bandar Baru and his entourage 
were to visit the base camp of the forestry company PT Tri 
Jasa Karya Inti. On the way, their car was attacked with 
gunfire; a company official died and the subdistrict chief 
was seriously wounded. Local people say th.at employees 
of the company were planning to boycott the elections and 
the visit was meant to exert pressure on them not to do so. 
The attackers apparently wore battle dress. The Jiem-Jiem 
area is a no-go area where outsiders need special permis-
sion to enter. Local inhabitants are required to report to the 
local military post if they intend to leave their village for 
more than twelve hours. 
In an incident in the Asan Thu Pudeng village also in 
the Pidie district, Muhammad Thaib a former village head 
was attacked on 16 July by ten people all equipped with 
rifles and in full battle dress. He was executed on the spot. 
Predictably, the military blame the killings on the GAM 
guerrillas without giving any proof. GAM has not issued 
any statement The two incidents have been used by the 
army to step up their military operations and justify their 
massive presence in the area. 
The killing of Abdul Hamid bin Itam 
The situation in Pidie is a reflection of how grim things 
are in Aceh. It is in a state of siege where the military act 
with impunity in almost everything they do, including 
murder. An incident that goes back one year serves as a 
good example because the case is well documented. 
Abdul Hamid, 45, a civil servant at the Pidie district of-
fice, lived in the village of Tampieng Baroh, about 6kms 
from the district capital, Pidie. He often took an evening 
stroll to Pidie to meet friends and to visit a local coffee 
shop popular as a meeting place for businessmen and offi-
cials to discuss deals and contracts. 
At 9pm on 13 September 1996, Abdul Hamid was vis-
ited at the shop by a man known to be a member of Kopas-
sus, the red beret commandos based in Sigli. They left to-
gether by car, a Taft-GT owned by Amirullah, a well-
known businessman in Pidie. Abdul Hamid was taken to 
the Kopassus office in Sigli and told not to meddle in cer-
tain matters. A heated row ensued, Abdul Hamid was 
beaten and hit hard with the butt of a rifle. He lost con-
sciousness and around midnight he was taken by car to a 
mountainous region some l 80kms away from Sigli. He 
was shot twice and thrown down a cliff. In the morning 
somebody riding a motorbike saw blood on the road and 
after looking down the cliff, saw the body of Abdul Hamid. 
The police was called and his corpse was immediately 
taken to Lamno, a nearby village. Four days later his 
cousin identified the corpse as being that of Abdul Hamid. 
There are enough witnesses who were at the coffee 
shop and who saw Abdul Hamid leaving with the soldier. 
Local people are well aware that he was being threatened 
and that the district chief of Pidie was deeply involved in 
the matter. The police is not willing to do anything, the 
silence of the grave. 
The BCA bank robbery 
Aceh has been the scene of many brutal incidents since 
the late eighties. The security forces always blame every-
thing, including ordinary criminal activities, on GAM 
On 4 February this year a spectacular bank robbery took 
place in Lhok Seumawe. At 11 am, when the streets were 
very busy, a cash-box was grabbed from BCA security 
guards. During the chase of the three bank robbers, several 
soldiers were injured by gunfire. Many people saw the 
faces of the young bank robbers. As usual, the robbery was 
described as an act of GAM terrorism. 
With not a shred of evidence, the military claimed a few 
days later that Rahman Paloh, a well known GAM com-
mander from the Pase sub-district, and his unit were re-
sponsible for the robbery. Several arrests took place and it 
was later reported that Rahman Paloh and his lieutenant 
had been ambushed and killed. When photos of the dead 
men were published in the local Aceh newspaper, Serambi 
Indonesia, several witnesses said they bore no resemblance 
to the three young bank robbers they had seen. The bank 
robbery became a justification for the military to launch a 
vicious clampdown. More than 30 people have been de-
tained for alleged involvement in the robbery or for having 
weapons at home. Most are to be put on trial. It is feared 
that some of the detained have suffered a great deal during 
interrogation [see TAPOL Bulletin No. 140, April 1997]. 
Police attacked campus 
The heavily militarised situation in Aceh often leads to 
n~ty incidents. Quite unexpectedly on 1 September, a 
fnendly soccer match between a team of the Technical 
Faculty of the Universitas Syiah Kuala (FT) and a team of 
Brimob, the mobile brigade special police task force, 
turned very nasty. 
When a policeman ordered supporters of the FT team to 
fold up their banners during the match, a heated argument 
~nsued; the policeman started beating up a student. Fight-
mg broke out between students and the security apparatus. 
One Brimob sergeant who was particularly vicious re-
ceived several blows from the angry crowd. 
The same evening a car, two pick-ups and three trucks 
loaded with Brimob personnel arrived at the campus. Stu-
dents were beaten up, kicked and mauled at random. Some 
were slashed with bayonets or bashed with rifle butts. The 
Brimob gang also entered several dormitories and started 
dragging students from their rooms. Some students who 
were taking a nap also received blows and their heads were 
dashed against the walls. A report by the Student Senate of 
Aceh's only university reports that at least 27 people were 
injured, some of them seriously, and had to be treated in 
hospital. 
The fate of the Acehnese refugees 
The plight of the Acehnese refugees, most of them in 
neighbouring Malaysia, remains worrying. In general the 
Malaysian government has refused to grant them refugee 
status but call them .'illegal entrants' and regard them as a 
danger because their presence can jeopardise Malaysia's 
relations with Indonesia. [See TAPOL Bulletin No. 139, 
February 1997] 
The thousands of Acehnese refugees came in droves 
during the early nineties when ABRI combed villages 
along the eastern and northern coast of Aceh. Things be-
came so extreme that some villages were almost com-
continued on page 11 
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Abducted East Timorese tells his story 
Tomas Alfredo is one of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of East Timorese who, as children were ab-
ducted by Indonesians during the occupation of their country. He was abducted in 1979 at the age of 
two, grew up in Indonesia and had no idea that he was East Timorese until he was seventeen years 
old. He has been living in Lisbon since May 1996, after escaping through the Dutch embassy in Ja-
karta. He told his story to TAPOL. 
Were you alone when you were abducted? 
No, I was abducted with my five-year-old my sister 
Sonia. I was two years old. But I should have had a 
younger sibling as well because my mother was pregnant 
when she was killed. · 
What happened to your parents? 
They were both arrested and killed in Los Palos by In-
donesian soldiers on the same day, on 11 June 1979. They 
were separated from each other and killed in different 
places. 
After our parents were killed, my sister and I were 
taken to a concentration camp at a Protestant church, 
Gereja Emanuel. While we were there an Indonesian 
named Jatrik who was working as an assistant to the bupati 
(district head) of Los Palos decided that he wanted to adopt 
us, so he and the bupati wrote a document handing us over 
to Jatrik. This was our so-called adoption certificate. Jatrik 
was a Protestant minister from Kalimantan living in Ja-
karta. 
What was Jatrik doing in East Timor? 
He was a civil servant who worked at the Interior Min-
istry in Jakarta and he was given the task of learning about 
East Timorese society. Because of this, he learned to speak 
Tetum. So, having decided to adopt us, he took us to Ja-
karta by helicopter. There were altogether fourteen of us, 
all children as young as my sister and me, who were taken 
away by helicopter. We had all been kept in an orphanage 
for children who were thought to be the children of mem-
bers of Fretilin. 
Do you have any recollections of what was happen-
ing at the time of your abduction? 
Yes, even though I was so young, I still remember 
hearing people in pain, screaming. I remember hearing the 
sound of gunfire and I remember hearing bombs exploding 
and the drones of helicopters flying overhead. One thing I 
also remember was being thrown into a ditch but I can't 
remember who did this. I also have a clear recollection of 
my body being covered with flies. 
What happened when you got to Jakarta? 
We only stay with Jatrik for about two or three weeks 
because he and his wife who was pregnant began to dislike 
us and wanted to get rid of us. So one night, they dumped 
us both. They dumped me in a ditch about 200 metres from 
their home and they dumped my sister on the doorstep of a 
children's home called Panti Asuhan van der Steur which 
was run by Dutch people The two of us became separated 
and I didn't see my sister again for fifteen years. 
Tomas Alfredo being interviewed by Carmel Budiardjo 
A woman named Ibu L. S. found me the next morning 
in the ditch and took me in. When she found me, I was un-
conscious. I stayed with lbu S. for four years and she 
looked after me as if I was her own child. She told me be-
fore she died in 1983 that her husband had been arrested 
because he was from the PKI (Communist Party). He was 
imprisoned in Cimahi in West Java. She herself had been a 
member of the left wing women's organisation, Gerwani. 
Ibu S. had me baptised as a Catholic and put me into a pri-
mary school to start my education. She looked after me 
very well. 
Did she know you were from East Timor? 
Yes, she did. After she found me, Jatrik showed her his 
adoption paper from East Timor. But she didn't want to tell 
anyone about my origins. The only person she told was her 
daughter Lucia but Lucia was told never to tell me. I didn't 
find out anything about my true origins until very much 
later, in 1994. 
But to return to 1983, before she died my foster mother 
asked a friend of hers, Ibu Diana, a Muslim woman, to take 
me in after her death. lbu Diana was a hajja, meaning she 
had done the pilgrimage to Mecca. She began to bring me 
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up and educate me as a Muslim. I stayed with her for about 
two years. But she treated me very badly. She made me 
clean the house like a servant. She often beat me when I 
did something wrong. Once, she even pushed me down the 
stairs. 
Then Ibu S's daughter Lucia came to lbu Diana's look-
' ' 1 mg for me and asked her to let me go. She wouldn t et me 
out of her grip unless Lucia paid her two million rupiahs. 
After Lucia found the money, I went to live with her. By 
this time, Lucia was married and had a child of her own. I 
started going to school again and at first I was treated very 
well. But then, her husband took a dislike to me. I contin-
ued to be brought up as a Muslim because, although Lucia 
was a Catholic, her husband was a Muslim. Her husband 
was always angry with me and kept putting me into differ-
ent schools. We also travelled all across Java, from west to 
east, then to Central Java During the two years I was with 
them, I went to no fewer than nine different schools. He 
also changed my name several times because I was so 
naughty. I had been baptised Tomas Alfredo but now my 
name was changed to Abdulrahman, then to Tommy Ab-
dulrahman. He seemed to think my behaviour would im-
prove if my name was changed. 
How long did all this go on for? 
About two years. Then they sent me to a Muslim school 
called Pesantren Gontor, in Ponorogo, East Java. I had to 
study Arabic during the week and study English on Satur-
day and Sunday. In 1987, after a year at the pesantren, I 
went back to Jakarta and I told Lucia and her husband that 
I didn't want to return to the pesantren. I didn't like it there 
because I was often punished. So they moved me again, to 
Cimahi, West Jav~. ·I stayed with a relative of Lucia's hus-
band in the barracks of an army unit called Armed-13 (field 
artillery unit.) The man I stayed with was from Menado. I 
was given a very harsh training, with army discipline and I 
always had to get up very early. 
Did anyone there know you were East Timorese? 
Some of them thought I might be Timorese because I 
was so dark, but I thought I was Ambonese. I had ne~er 
heard of East Timor, though I could remember hearmg 
gunfire when I was small. I was at Armed-13 for a year and 
went to school, starting at fourth grade, then going up to 
fifth grade of primary school, SD. But I had become ~o 
difficult to control that they moved me to a hostel m 
Yogyakarta for people from North Sulawesi. After staying 
there for a while, I returned to Jakarta hoping to enrol at an 
SMP (lower secondary school). This was in 1989. But Lu-
cia and her husband wouldn't allow me to go to school. 
They wanted me to help in the house, look a~er the car and 
become their servant, not go to school. Lucia had by now 
changed, under the influence of her husband. 
I was very unhappy so I ran away and I began to live 
like a street child, sleeping in railway carriages, in shop 
entrances on the street. I never became a beggar but I was 
homeless: a street urchin: I started selling cigarettes, drinks, 
anything to make a living. ~ was o~en k~cked ~ut of.place~, 
beaten up or picked up durmg pohce raids. I hved hke this 
for about a year. Then I went back to Lucia but after a 
while, I ran away again. 
During this time, I travelled everywher~ in ~av~. I can 
tell you, I have visited every place you can 1m~me m Java 
from Merak on the western tip to Surabaya m East Java, 
riding on trains or buses. Like befo~e, I mad~ a living s~ll­
ing cigarettes or drinks. I often got m~olved m brawls with 
other children to protect my own tradmg patch. ~at. I was 
doing was very risky because I didn't have. pef1!11ss1on to 
sell things in the street and I didn't have an 1dent1ty card, a 
KTP. I was often arrested by the police and had to pay 
them money to be released. I lived like this for a l?ng time 
and made many friends, in all parts of Java. I got mvolved 
in many actions against the police and also. in ~orkers' ~c­
tions. Some of my friends managed to get Jobs m factones 
and got involved in the workers' struggle. 
Were you able to get a job in a factory? 
I almost did once but I didn't have a KTP so I was not 
taken on. But some of my friends got jobs so I got involved 
when they took part in industrial disputes. 
Eventually I went back to Jakarta, to Lucia's place 
again. I asked her to let me go to SMP and in the end she 
agreed. Among the friends that I had made, there were 
East Timorese and I began to hear about conditions there, 
which made me very sad. But I still didn't realise that I was 
from East Timor. I met some Timorese in Blok M. 
I went to SMP for three years, from 1991 till 1994. I 
stayed with Lucia for my first two years at SMP, then I 
went to stay with a relative of hers.This was when I went 
back to live in the place where I had lived with Ibu S. 
which was near Pak Jatrik. It was while I was there that I 
started getting letters from relatives in East Timor, from an 
uncle of mine. The man who had been bupati at the time of 
my abduction told my uncle in Los Palos that my sister and 
I had been taken to Jakarta. He was given Pak Jatrik's ad-
dress and started writing to me. 
I now discovered that I was born not on 15 June 1977 
but on 8 August 1977. The date on my KTP was wrong. 
Now at last I knew that I was Timorese. My sister was still 
living at the Panti Asuhan. We met each other again in 
May 1994. She had stayed in the hostel all that time. 
What was it like meeting your sister again? 
I had lived for such a long time without knowing any-
one from my own family that when I met her, it came as a 
terrible shock. She knew she had a . younger brother but I 
didn't know I had a sister. It was a big shock to me but it 
was an even greater shock to her. I felt very sad at all the 
things that had happened to us but I didn't want to show my 
feelings. I had had so many bitter experiences but I didn't 
want to express my feelings by crying. I was really very 
sad and I found it very difficult to believe that I was from 
East Timor. I wanted to see the evidence. I wanted to see 
the letter handing me over to Pak Jatrik. I got hold of the 
original which is now with my uncle in East Timor. 
Pak Jatrik as well as Lucia and her husband didn't want 
to let me go back to East Timor. They said I should stay in 
Jakarta and continue with my education. But I very much 
wanted to go back. My uncle also said I should return 
home. He said that's where my parents were buried and. I 
should go back home. I had a strange idea of what East 
Timor was like. I imagined it as very backward place, just 
mountains and villages, with no cities like Java. 
So my sister and I went back to East Timor in June 
1994. When I arrived back in East Timor, it was late at 
night. When I first saw Dili I thought it was a very beauti-
ful place. The first thing I did in the harbour on my arrival 
was to kneel down three times and kiss the ground. 
to be continued in the next TAPOL Bulletin 
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Call for elderly tapols to be freed 
Human rights activists from three NGOs in Jakarta met 
members of National Human Rights Commission to dis-
cuss the fate of convicted political prisoners (tapols), in 
particular those who are advanced in age. 
Bonar Tigor Naipospos of MIK, the Humanitarian As-
sociation, said that a number of tapols who were convicted 
in connection with the events in October 1965 were suf-
fering from various ailments and should be released on 
humanitarian grounds. Colonel Latief, formerly of the Ja-
karta military command, had recently suffered a stroke and 
was hardly able to speak. He is serving a life sentence. 
Two pleas for clemency were turned down and the fate of 
the third one is not known. 
The others in the delegation were Gustav Dupe from the 
Indonesian Council of Churches and Mindo Rajagukguk 
from the New Life Foundation. 
The group also spoke about two prisoners serving sen-
tences for the Lampung incident in 1987. Fatah Kosim and 
Sudarsono had already served two thirds of their sentences 
and were now permitted to undertake activities outside 
prison (asimilasi). According to the rules, they were now 
entitled to conditional release but this had not been granted 
Mindo Rajagukguk said that prison conditions were de-
plorable in some parts of the country. Even. in Jakarta 
where conditions were somewhat better, they did not con-
form with the Minimum Standards for the Treatment of 
Prisoners adopted by the UN. Having visited prisons 
throughout Indonesia, Mindo said that in many pla.ces, 
prisoners were suffering ailments because of the atrocious 
conditions. 
Another of their concerns was that although the gov-
ernment had announced that distinguishing initials on 
identity cards, like ET for 'ex-taP_ol '. and OT for 
'organisasi terlarang' (banned orgamsation) would no 
longer be used, the fact was that the initials were still being 
used. 
NGO AGM broken up by police 
A North Sumatran network ofNGOs has sued the local 
police for banning its Annual Gen~ral Meeti~~ in June th.is 
year. The police accused th~ orgamsers of fail mg t~ obtam 
a police permit for the meetmg, even though accordmg to a 
recent regulation, no permit was needed. 
The annual meeting of Wahana Informasi Masyarakat 
(WIM), the Information Network which brings together a 
number ofNGOs throughout North Sumatra was scheduled 
to take place from 19 - 21 June 1997. S~ve~ty people had 
gathered at a hotel in Haranggaol, sub-distnct of. Si~alun­
gan, for the occasion, coming from the sub-d!stncts of 
North and South Tapanuli, Langkat, Asahan, Deh Serdang, 
Daiiiri and Medan. 
From early afternoon on the first day, police ~ere seen 
prowling around the hotel. They e~t:red the m~etmg-place 
in the evening and ordered the participants to disp~rse. T~e 
organisers protested, saying that the~. had comphe~ with 
requirements by notifying. the aut~orities one week i.n ad-
vance. When the police said they dtd not ~ave.a permit, t~e 
convenors said that according to a regulation mtroduce? m 
1995, permission was not requi~ed; all that was reqmred 
was for them to notify the pohce. However, they were 
forced to disband. 
HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEFS 
When the participants woke the next morning, they 
were told to leave the hotel where they were staying with-
out delay as the police had instructed the proprietor to tell 
them to leave. 
A police officer told the press that permission had been 
refused because the meeting 'was bound' to discuss matters 
of a political nature. WIM leaders in~i~t~d that this was. a 
routine meeting to evaluate past activities and enable its 
members to renew contact and discuss internal affairs. 
[Republika, 21 June] 
WIM is suing the local police for Rp 1.3 trillion 
(£300,000) for material and non-material losses. In .the 
early 1990s, many meetings were broken up by the pohce, 
leading to many protests at this intolerable abuse of the 
right of assembly. The interior and defence ministers then 
issued a joint decree in December 1995 stipulating that 
only large gatherings in public places required permission. 
In other cases, only advance notification was needed. 
The first court hearing was scheduled to take place on 2 
September. 
Timorese prisoner released to town arrest 
An East Timorese political prisoner who was sentenced 
to six and a half years for being present at the demonstra-
tion in Dili on 12 November 1991 when the Santa Cruz 
massacre took place, was released from prison in Sema-
rang, Central Java but was ordered not to leave the city. 
This means that he is being prevented from returning home 
to his family in East Timor. 
Juvencio Martins was transferred from a prison in Dili 
in May 1994 to Kedung Pane Prison in Semarang along 
with five others, all of them survivors of the Santa Cruz 
massacre. 
Bonar Tigor Naipospos whose association, MIK, is 
dedicated to the cause of political prisoners, said that the 
restrictions placed on Juvencio's movements was a breach 
of the regulations. Such restrictions were only allowed for 
people granted conditional release, whereas Juvencio has 
been released unconditionally, having served his full sen-
tence. 
Megawati barred from speaking in Sin-
gapore 
An invitation to Megawati Sukarnoputri, chairperson of 
the Indonesian Democratic Party, the PDI, to address a 
meeting of the Foreign Correspondents' Association in 
Singapore, was cancelled after Singapore's Ministry of 
Information and The Arts exerted pressure on the FCA. 
The FCA did not make this public at the time, but in a 
statement on 3 September, it said that the invitation to the 
Indonesian pro-democracy leader to address the Associa-
tion in August had been withdrawn at the request of the 
Government of Singapore. 
Responding to the news, Marzuki Darusman, deputy 
chair of Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission, 
said it was clear that the Singapore authorities had been 
under pressure. 'They were concerned to . preserve their 
good relations with Indonesia,' was all he would say. 
Asked whether he thought the government of Singapore 
had gone too far, Marzuki would only say that it had acted 
continued on .next page 
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'in a rather peculiar way in consideration of its national 
interests' . [Merdeka, 5 September] 
Arrested for Independence Day demo 
Eleven youths were arrested by the police in Bogor, 
West Java for organising a demonstration to celebrate the 
s2nd anniversary of Indonesia's Independence Day on 17 
August. The event, organised by a group called the Youth 
Front to Uphold People 's Rights, was attended by about 
fifty people. 
The event had passed peacefully with the singing of 
songs of struggle and speeches about the true meaning of 
independence. Banners saying, 'Independence should not 
teach people to be cowards', 'Development for the People', 
and 'Freedom of speech and opinion ' were held high. 
ENVIRONMENT 
continued from page 24 
more than a thousand spots of dangerously high tempera-
ture and Minister Sarwono has publicly admitted that the 
extent of the damage this year is likely to exceed that of 
1992. 
Who is to blame? 
In the past, government officials have always pointed 
the finger at shifting cultivation by local people despite the 
fact that they have managed their forests without catastro-
phe for generations. These days however, everyone recog-
nises that timber estates (HTI) and estates known as PIR or 
nuclear smallholding plantations, as well as transmigration 
sites set up by the goyernment are the real culprits. 
In an action that can only be described as being too lit-
tle, too late, the Forestry Minister, Djamaluddin, ordered 
one hundred and fifty plantation companies to halt opera-
tions. They were given two weeks to explain why hot spots 
BOO/( REVIEW 
continued from page 23 
As is made clear in several of the contributions, boy-
cotting Nike products is not a feature of the campaign be-
cause this is not what Indonesian workers are calling for. A 
boycott can lead to job losses, it conveys a negative mes-
sage to consumers and youth groups and fails to provide a 
platform for dialogue with the company. Target groups in 
the West include consumers, trade unions, women's groups, 
young people, politicians and the media. 
Much of the credit for building the US-based campaign 
on Nike in Indonesia should go to Jeff Ballinger who began 
to take an interest in the subject when he started working 
for the Asian-American Free Labour Institute (AFFLI) in 
Singapore in 1987. AAFLI produced the first major report 
on Nike in 1991. Although AAFLI is associated with the 
main US trade union, A'tL/CIO, this publication has ap-
peared without that union's ~ndorsement, suggest~ng that it 
is unwilling to get involved m such a t~~roughgomg .expo-
sure of a leading US company explo1tmg workers m the 
Asia-Pacific region. 
Jeff now camp"\igns through Press for Change, a tiny, 
poorly-resourced NGO which he set up in 1994. His Intro-
But as the demonstrators were marching past the Bogor 
police headquarters, members of the force attacke~ !hem 
and beat them up. A number of demonstrators were mJured 
in the fray. The most seriously injured was a 15-year-old 
secondary school student named Ade who was struck on 
the head with a baton. Eleven people were arrested. 
On the next day, security forces from the army and the 
police led by an intelligence officer named Situmorang 
forced their way into the Front's office and arrested two 
members of the organisation. 
On the following day, members of an organisation set 
up to protest against the arrests visited the National Human 
Rights Commission to lodge a complaint. They were ad-
vised that the arrests were unlawful and that those involved 
could bring charges against the police. Later that day, the 
thirteen youths were released. +r 
had occurred in their areas. He has threatened to terminate 
their licenses if they fail to come with satisfactory explana-
tions. 
Most of the so-called hot spots have been traced to land 
used by HTI and PIR estates, as well as transmigration 
sites. All three use fire for land-clearing purposes. The long 
dry monsoon this year has only made things worse. After 
the last calamity in 1994 the forestry department issued a 
decree prohibiting forestry companies from clearing land 
by burning but this year's disaster shows that enforcement 
has been pitiful although the state has powers to take vio-
lators to court. 
.On 20 September, students in Pontianak demonstrated 
outside the West Kalimantan forestry service in Pontianak. 
They were protesting against a statement earlier in the 
month when the head of the service blamed shifting culti-
vators for the fires. The demonstrators blamed the forestry 
service for the disaster and said that fourteen companies 
should be penalised. They carried posters calling for an end 
to all HTI and PIR estates in the region. [ Kompas, 21 
September] * 
duction to this excellent publication draws the information 
together, pointing out that although Nike has been com-
pelled by campaigners to adopt a Code of Conduct and-
make moves in the direction of monitoring practices by its 
contractors, ~onditions for the workers have hardly im-
proved. All manner of tricks are used to keep wages to the 
bare minimum and keep the workers in ignorance of what 
Nike is supposed to be doing to help. Until now, a basic 
demand that Nike's Code of Conduct, translated into Indo-
nesian, be displayed publicly in the factories has still not 
been met. 
As Jeff points out, 'after developing the mechanism 
which was to bind contractors to a set of standards, Nike 
failed to convince (them) of their resolve. The result is a 
system which continues to generate huge rewards for Nike 
but leaves workers in the unenviable position of fighting 
greedy contractors (who) are backed by a corrupt, authori-
tarian regime.' 
The campaign against Nike provides a model for labour 
activists in Indonesia as well as in the West. Behind the 
Swoosh is a powerful resource and an excellent example of 
how to back up a campaign with concrete information, free 
from rhetoric and focused on what needs to be done. * 
Carmel Budiardjo 
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Jeff Ballinger and Claes Olssen (eds), Behind the 
Swoosh: The Struggle of Indonesians Making 
Nike Shoes, Global Publications Foundation 
(UFFN Forlag, Box 1221, 751 42 Uppsala, Swe-
den), 1997. 224 pp. 
During the past year, there has been growing awareness 
in the US about the political and human rights situation in 
Indonesia, prompted by publicity about the crackdown 
against the pro-democracy movement in July 1996, the 
unrest during this year's general election which shook Su-
harto's New Order regime, and the scandal surrounding 
contributions to Clinton's 1996 presidential campaign by a 
US-based Indonesian company which continues to receive 
many column inches of coverage in major US newspapers. 
For several years, a number of US non-governmental 
. organisations and groups have been campaigning to expose 
the exploitation of workers employed by foreign and do-
mestic companies in Indonesia which manufacture shoes 
for Nike, the company that leads in the globalisation of 
shoe production. In June 1996, Cicih Sukaesih, a worker 
who was dismissed by a Nike contractor for her involve-
ment in · a strike, toured the US to alert consumers of con-
ditions in Nike-related factories. Neither Nike's chief ex-
ecutive, Phil Knight, now one of America's richest men, 
nor its star endorser, Michael Jordan, wanted to meet her. 
This book will certainly help to consolidate this cam-
paign, providing well-documented information about the 
reality for workers producing the most sought-after, highly-
priced footware sold through one of the slickest advertising 
campaigns anywhere in the Western world. 
120,000 Indonesian workers, most of them young 
women, are employed by fourteen companies in Indonesia 
contracted to manufacture Nike shoes. Nike's decision to 
shift manufacturing to Indonesia and Thailand came in 
1987, as wages in South Korea and Taiwan began to rise. 
Indonesia offered an attractive alternative, not only because 
of the unlimited availability of cheap labour but also be-
cause the Suharto regime has imposed stricter controls on 
unions than anywhere in the Asia-Pacific region. Indonesia 
now accounts for 37 per cent of Nike products worldwide. 
BOOK REVIEW 
However, there are signs that Nike is already looking for 
other, cheaper labour in countries like Vietnam and China, 
now that the Suharto regime has marginally improved the 
minimum wage, albeit to a level that is still far from meet-
ing a worker's most basic needs. 
Behind the Swoosh reveals that the operations of Indo-
nesia-based Nike contractors in particular and conditions in 
shoe-manufacturing companies in general, have been well-
researched. The report by the Australian agency, Commu-
nity Aid Abroad entitled, 'Sweating for Nike', gives a 
point-by-point rebuttal of the spurious arguments put for-
ward by Nike's propaganda machine. In a section entitled 
'The Cost of a Pair of Shoes', CAA shows that production 
labour accounts for $2.75 or less than four per cent of the 
total cost of $70.00 of a pair of shoes. Given that this figure 
includes salaries paid to managers, some of whom are 
earning as much as 65 times the wages paid to workers, the 
figure conceals the true level of exploitation of the factory 
workers. Promotion and advertising on the ether hand 
which include fees for star promoters like Michael Jordan, 
accounts for $4.00, revealing the obscene disparity be-
tween what star-endorsers receive and the pittance paid to 
the tens of thousands who make the shoes. 
Nike's system of globalised production and sub-
contracting manufacturing to local companies reaps a num-
ber of advantages. It enables Nike to distance itself from 
the exploitative conditions involved in the manufacture of 
their products, it enables the company to play off one sup-
plier against another so as to obtain the cheapest price 
while insisting on a high quality of work, and it enables the 
company to play off on·e government against another so as 
to obtain the best investment conditions for its contractors. 
Another contribution contains the results of research 
undertaken in August 1996 by the Indonesian Sportshoes 
Monitoring Network, a group of seven Indonesian NGOs. 
At first, they approached Nike with a proposal for inde-
pendent monitoring. After several months, the company's 
Director of Labour Practices Dusty Kidd sent them the Ex-
ecutive Summary of an audit undertaken by a Nike-
appointed company, Ernst and Young, but refused to let 
them have the full report. The ISSMN research covered all 
14 companies in Indonesia which produce shoes for Nike 
and dealt with every aspect of working conditions. 
With regard to unions, it said that while most of the 
companies have unions, union officials are generally se-
lected by management, not elected by the workers. Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreements are drafted by management 
and presented to union officials for their signature, without 
negotiation. Moreover, the Agreements are not made avail-
able to the workers even after they are formally adopted by 
management and union officials. 
A contribution by Indonesian labour activist Fauzi Ab-
dullah and Dutch union leader, Tom Etty puts such prac-
tices into context by describing the labour situation in In-
donesia as 'would be' and 'make believe'. In other words, 
the reality has nothing whatever to do with appearances. 
So-called Collective Labour Agreeements are in fact noth-
ing of the sort. In most instances, there is no such thing as 
bargaining. 'If the union makes demands, it is in a setting 
where the employer listens and then makes a binding deci-
sion.' continued on page 22 
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Environmental calamity in the making 
In September several Southeast Asian countries declared a state of emergency. The thick smoke 
which has blanketed parts of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore for months had reached intolerable 
levels. The blame for the disasters lies .squarely on forestry companies and the Indonesian govern-
ment which has allowed deforestation to proceed virtually unchecked. 
In face of criticism from several ASEAN countries and 
growing public concern throughout Southeast Asia as 
scores of fires blaze unchecked in Kalimantan and Suma-
tra, President Suharto was forced to make a public apology, 
which is not normal for an autocratic Javanese ruler. After 
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months of inaction. Sumatra and Kalimantan were declared 
disaster areas in September, and a few days later the Ma-
laysian government declared that Serawak in eastern Ma-
laysia was in the state of environmental emergency. Re-
ports indicate that serious forest fires are also burning in 
the east, notably in West Papua. 
Choking the population 
Tens of millions of people in Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore are suffering the effects of the fires. An Air 
Pollution Index in excess of 200 is regarded as a health 
hazard, but with API above 600 in some parts of the re-
gion, doctors throughout the disaster area are reporting a 
huge upsurge in respiratory diseases such as asthma and 
bronchitis, as well as smarting eyes and skin rashes. In 
Central Kalimantan visibility has fallen to 25 metres and 
people in parts of Sumatra like Rengat in Riau have been 
advised to evacuate. Environment Minister Sarwono 
Kusumaatmadja told reporters that visibility in Rengat had 
fallen to zero. Transmigration sites in Central Kalimantan 
have been razed to the ground by the forest fires. Thou-
sands of flights have been cancelled and road traffic has 
been brought to a virtual halt because of the thick smoke. 
The Malaysian authorities are now blaming the Indone-
sian government which seems powerless to act.. It has no 
adequate fire-fighting equipment and is waiting for the 
rains, while admitting that they are unlikely to start for 
months. Artificial rain techniques have been used with little 
effect and aircraft loaded with ocean water have been un-
able to take off because of the smoke. 
Not the first time 
Fires have destroyed huge swathes of forest in Indone-
sia over the past decade and a half. In 1992, one of the 
world's worst environmental disasters struck Kalimantan 
when two million hectares of tropical forest were de-
stroyed. Two years later, there was another major disaster 
when hundreds of thousands of hectares went up in flames . 
Despite the recurrence of forest fires, the Indonesian gov-
ernment has done virtually nothing to take preventive ac-
tion. 
Until recently, the latest disaster was hardly mentioned 
in the Indonesian press but it is now being admitted th~t 
things look very bleak. By the third week of September, 
167 so-called 'hot spots' had been recorded across Sumatra 
and Kalimantan. The coordinating team for land and fire 
control estimates that about 300,000 hectares of forest have 
already been destroyed. Satellite photos have identified 
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